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MONEY 
ITS C O N N E X I O N W I T H R I S I N G A N D F A L L I N G 
P R I C E S 
§ i. Introduction. 
Many economic principles can be dealt with best 
in the first place on the assumption that when a 
change is observed in the price of a particular commo-
dity or service it means a change of value peculiar 
to that one kind of commodity or service, and is not 
merely a part of a general change in the level of 
prices, which is only another name for a change in 
the value of money. In civilized countries in ordinary 
times, as in England for nearly a century before the 
War broke out in 1914, general changes in prices—• 
rises or falls of prices taken as a whole—were per-
ceptible enough to experts and students, but were 
too gradual to be realised by the mass of the people, 
or even to exercise any easily recognized influence on 
the actions of the commercial and investing classes. 
In 1913 the author of Wealth : a Brief Explanation 
of the Causes of Material Welfare, might well feel 
himself justified in omitting the subject. But in 
1918 the position is different: the War has brought 
about a change in the general level of prices or value 
of money so great and so rapid that it is perceptible 
to everyone, and has immensely disturbed the relative 
material welfare of classes and individuals and be-
come an acknowledged cause of action in numerous 
directions. 
To endeavour to acquire some clear notion of what 
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makes the value of money change has become the 
duty of all who think themselves capable of expressing 
useful opinions on economic affairs. The following 
pages embody an attempt to assist in this task. They 
do not profess to be exhaustive : investigation of the 
past and discussion of schemes for the future have 
both been sacrificed in order that space might be 
gained for treatment of the present. 
§ 2. Recognition and, measurement of changes in the 
value of money. 
A great many attempts have been made to define 
money in few words. They have failed like similar 
attempts to define other economic terms commonly 
used in ordinary language. They fail because money, 
like most of the other great economic terms, and like 
nearly all words in common use, means different 
things in different contexts. In a context like 
the present, which suggests an investigation into 
the causes of rising and falling prices, it means the 
unit of account commonly used in purchases and 
sales and other commercial transactions. In the 
United Kingdom, Australia and South Africa, 
people buy goods with and sell them for pounds, 
shillings and pence, and " p r i c e s " are always ex-
pressed in quantities of these units : in the United 
States and Canada dollars and cents are used for the 
purpose : in France, francs and centimes : in India 
rupees, annas and pice. But as the cent and centime 
are merely decimal fractions of the dollar and franc, 
and the shilling and penny merely vulgar fractions 
of the pound, and annas and pice the same of the 
rupee, we can say for short and without any risk of 
being misunderstood, that the unit of account in 
these countries is the pound, the dollar, the franc, and 
the rupee. When, then, it is said in England that 
the value of money has fallen, what is meant is that 
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a pound sterling, £1, will buy less than before : 
when the same words are used in the United States 
what is meant is that a dollar, will buy less ; 
when in France, that a franc, i f . , and in India, that 
a rupee, R i , will buy less. Thus an alteration in the 
general level of prices is the same thing as an alter-
ation in the value of money, except of course that it 
is upsidedown, a fall in the value of money being a 
rise in the general level of prices, and a rise in its 
value being a fall in that level. As prices are expressed 
in quantities of the unit of account, this is a matter 
which could not possibly be otherwise. The price of 
things is the money got for them ; the value of money 
is the things got for it. 
Till recently there have been many persons, and 
perhaps there still are some, who manifest an extra-
ordinary reluctance to admit the occurrence of any 
change in the general level of prices in their own time. 
They appear to have at the back of their minds an 
impression that money has become invariable in 
value, so that prices taken as a whole are no longer 
subject to change, however much variation there may 
be in the prices of particular commodities. W h y such 
changes should have been possible in the past, as 
they admit, and not in the present, they are never 
able to explain, and their reluctance to admit the 
possibility of changes in the present is only the 
consequence of their being so habitually accustomed 
to measure values by money that they feel towards 
any suggestion that the value of money itself wants 
measuring just as the aged villager feels towards the 
suggestion that the distance between two milestones 
from which he has throughout life taken his idea of 
a mile is fifty yards short ; and the suggestion that 
the value of money has changed appears as incred-
ible to them as the suggestion that the whole of the 
West Riding of Yorkshire had risen a foot between 
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two Ordnance Surveys would appear to the average 
inhabitant of Huddersfield. 
Being unable to bring forward any reasons why 
changes in the value of money and general level of 
prices should have become impossible, those who 
dislike the idea are obliged to confine themselves to 
questioning the existence of each particular change 
which happens to take place in their time. It is 
therefore necessary for us to begin by making clear 
how such changes may be recognized and roughly 
measured. We cannot expect to find in actual life 
a general rise of prices manifesting itself as a uniform 
rise, say of 10 per cent, in the price of each single 
commodity and service. If we did expect such a 
thing, it would imply that we also thought that if 
the general level of prices remained stationary, say 
between to-day and next year, the price of each 
single commodity would be precisely the same next 
year as to-day. Of course we expect nothing of the 
kind : we know that particular prices are affected 
by various diverse influences and are constantly 
changing. In the event of a general rise or fall of 
prices there is no reason for supposing that these 
influences would be any more quiescent than when no 
such change was proceeding. When there is a general 
rise, some things will rise much and others little, 
and some are likely even to fall. How then can we 
judge whether there has been a change in the general 
level, and if we are satisfied that such a change has 
occurred, how can we judge whether it is great or 
small ? 
The process is analogous to that which would be 
employed in ascertaining whether and if so by how 
much the existing level of an acre of ground which 
has been very much disturbed by operations upon it 
is lower than it was before. Let us say that Jones 
and Smith have been comrades in the War, and on 
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the conclusion of peace they return home to find that 
a field belonging to Smith has been used for training 
recruits in trench warfare. Formerly it was flat and 
level with the surrounding fields, now the digging and 
mining have made it into something like a model of 
Switzerland. Smith is informed by a friend (who 
does not want his name mentioned) and believes, that 
Jones' father, the only haulier in the village, has taken 
advantage of its disturbed condition to carry away 
many loads of gravel from it. He tells this to Jones, 
who replies indignantly " Father would never do a 
thing like that ," and points out that if so much gravel 
had been removed, the general level of the ground 
would have been perceptibly reduced. Smith and 
Jones go together to look at the ground, and to 
Smith's eye the field seems on the whole very decidedly 
lower—" about two feet," he guesses. Jones is led 
by bias in favour of Jones senior to think there is no 
difference, and draws Smith's attention to the par-
ticularly high parts of the ground : Smith in return 
points to the biggest depressions. To settle the 
question, they agree to run a level line of rods across 
the field sufficiently high to clear the hills and measure 
down from it at frequent fixed intervals, say every 
two yards, to the present surface. This done, they 
find that the average of all the measurements indi-
cates a level of 10 inches below the old level. This 
is a blow to Jones, but not so much as Smith expected, 
so the two agree that this result " is not sufficient to 
go b y , " and take another line across the field ; this 
shows an average fall of 8 inches, and averaged with 
the first line, 9 inches. Both being still dissatisfied, 
they take four more lines which give as their results falls 
of 11, 9, 12 and 8 inches. The average for the whole 
of the measurements is now 9!, and both Smith and 
Jones see that more measurements will make very 
little difference. Smith is willing to admit that the 
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fall need not be more than about 10 inches, and 
Jones finds it expedient to abandon the argument 
that nothing has been removed, and to find some 
other defence for his parent. 
Commodities and services are so numerous in 
kind and the kinds shade into each other so gradually, 
that to take into account the price of all of them is 
much like taking into account the level of every part 
of a rough field, when smoothing it is not to be 
thought of. We cannot do it literally, and must be 
content with taking a sufficient number of measure-
ments at points selected without bias. The ordinary 
person's impression about a general change of prices 
is much like Smith's measurement of the level of his 
field " by the eye " ; it is likely that he will be able 
to recognize a large change of prices—probably 
anything over 25 per cent., just as Smith is 
likely to be able to detect a fall of 10 feet in the 
general level of his field. When the change is not 
great, he is just as likely as Jones to be misled by 
bias into denying its existence, and in all cases bias 
is likely to mislead him, as it led Smith, into very 
faulty estimates. To arrive at agreement it is neces-
ary, as in the case of the disturbed field, to introduce 
statistical methods, and this is done by the construc-
tion of what are called " index numbers " of prices. 
The prices of a large number of commodities at some 
particular date, called for this purpose the " base 
year " or the " standard year," are collected, and the 
prices of the same commodities at subsequent (or 
earlier) dates are represented as percentages of the 
prices of the base year. If beef cost 10d. per lb. in 
the base year and 13d. at some later date, it is put 
down at 100 for the first and 130 for the second 
period, since if it takes 13d. to buy what formerly 
could be got for 10d., it takes 130^. to buy what 
could formerly be got for 100. The prices of a 
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number of other commodities are treated in the same 
way, so that each stands at 100 for the base year 
and some other number, larger or smaller than 100 
according as its price has risen or fallen, for the period 
to be compared with the base-year. Then, as each 
of the commodities stands at 100 for the base-year, 
the average or " index-number " for that year will 
be 100, while the index number for the other date will 
be the average of a number of figures each of which 
may be above or below 100. When this index-
number is above 100, the excess will indicate a rise 
of that much per cent, in the general level of prices, 
and when it is below the deficit will indicate a fall 
of that much. Thus in what is known as Sauerbeck's 
index number, in which the base or standard period 
is the years 1867-77 averaged, the index number for 
1896 is 61 ; that for each of the years 19x2 to 1914, 
85 ; for 1915, 108, for 1916, 136 ; for 1917, 174. 
This means that the general level of prices was in 
1896 39 per cent, below that of 1867-77, while in 
1912-14 it was only 15 per cent, below, and in 1917 
it was 74 per cent, above the 1867-77 level. (The 
figures for each year are the average of 12 records 
taken at monthly intervals, e.g. the 174 for 1917 is 
made up of figures rising from 159*3 in January to 
185'! in December.) There are many difficulties in 
the construction of an index number, the chief being 
that of finding commodities which do not vary much 
in kind or quality, and have prices about which 
dispute is impossible, but none of the difficulties are 
sufficient to prevent the method from making it 
possible to prove any substantial change in the 
general level of prices and to measure approximately 
its magnitude.1 
Granting that changes in the general level of prices 
1 For t h e discussion of the principles of index numbers, 
see A . L . B o w l e y . Elements of Statistics 
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or value of money can and do occur, and that we can 
appreciate their existence and approximately measure 
their magnitude, we can proceed to consider their 
causes. In other words we can ask why is it that a 
unit of account such as the pound sterling or the 
rupee is of greater value—will buy more—at one 
time than at another ? The subject, or so much of 
it as is of immediate modern interest, may be divided 
according as the unit of account is a mere quantity 
of bullion, a coin kept by limitation at a value above 
that of its bullion contents, or, finally, a note. 
§ 3. The value of money or general level of prices where 
the unit of account is a fixed quantity of bullion, 
uncoined or coined. 
The unit of account has often and for long periods 
been nothing but a quantity—which has almost 
always if not always meant a weight—of a particular 
metal. The English " pound," still indicated by 
the initial letter of the Roman libra, being the name 
of a weight as well as a unit of account, serves to 
remind us of that time. The introduction of coinage 
makes it possible to count the amount of metal, 
" reckon it by tale," instead of weighing it with 
scales every time it passes from hand to hand, which 
is a great improvement, but it need not make, and 
sometimes has not made, any material difference to 
the value of the unit ; a mint may coin all the bullion 
which any one chooses to bring to it and give it back 
to him free of any deduction or charge, while at the 
same time the law allows any one to do what he likes 
with the coin—to export it from the country in which 
it is or to melt it down at home for any purpose 
whatever. In this case a pound weight of bullion 
is freely convertible into a pound weight of coin and 
a pound weight of coin is freely convertible into a 
pound of bullion, and the two must therefore be of 
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equal value : if the coin were worth more than an 
equal weight of uncoined metal, people would be 
carrying the uncoined to the Mint : if coin were 
worth less than uncoined, they would be melting the 
coin down. The fact that the uncoined metal and 
the coined continue to exist side by side is proof of 
their being, weight for weight, of equal value. We 
are not to say that the value of the coin is determined 
by that of the uncoined metal any more than we are 
to say that the value of the uncoined metal is deter-
mined by that of the coin, but we can say unhesitat-
ingly that the two are connected together and must 
stand at the same level just as much as the water in 
two cisterns connected b y a large pipe. 
This was the situation, for example, in England 
from soon after the end of the Napoleonic war till 
1 9 1 4 ; the unit of account called the " pound," 
originally a pound weight of silver, had through 
various vicissitudes come to be represented by a 
gold coin called a sovereign made out of 113 grains 
of pure gold and i o j of negligible alio}/-; coinage was 
free and gratuitous, and coins could be melted or 
transported anywhere at the will of the owner. 
What, by an historical survival, was called " a pound " 
might have been translated into 113 grains of fine 
gold in every contract and commercial transaction 
without producing any sort of dislocation or causing 
any one to lose or gain. It is true that people con-
stantly paid each other " pounds " without passing 
either shapeless lumps of gold or sovereigns from 
hand to hand : they paid in bank-notes and they 
paid in cheques, but any one who got a five-pound 
banknote (no smaller notes were allowed in England 
and Wales) could if he pleased demand five sover-
eigns for it from the bank that issued it, and anyone 
who received a good cheque could demand payment 
of its amount either in sovereigns or in Bank of 
IO MONEY 
England notes which could be " converted into " 
sovereigns by demand on the Bank. So that anyone 
paying or receiving " pounds " was always giving 
or getting something equivalent to 113 grains of 
gold. Thus the value of the pound was identical 
with the value of gold—what a pound would " buy " 
was just the same as what 113 grains of gold would 
exchange for. 
So the value or purchasing power of English money 
— o f the pound sterling—could be, and generally 
was, quite properly discussed as the value of gold. 
An answer to the question what made gold exchange 
for more of other commodities on the whole was an 
answer to the question what made the pound exchange 
for or " buy " more of other commodities on the 
whole. 
The value of a precious metal is dependent on just 
the same things as the value of any other metal. If 
more people demand it (that is want it and have 
means to pay for it), or if the same number of persons 
demand more, it will rise in value, and vice versa. 
If more persons are willing and able to produce it, 
or if the persons already engaged in its production 
are able and willing to produce more of it, its value 
will tend to fall. 
No one will find much difficulty in appreciating 
this so far as the demand for purposes other than 
currency are concerned. Any one can see that gold 
is a metal which is prized for purposes of ornament, 
which is extraordinarily convenient for hoarding as 
a store of treasure to be expended at a future date, 
and which is at present very useful for many industrial 
purposes and would be gladly used for many more 
if only it were cheaper. About the changes of demand 
in relation to all these there is so little difficulty that 
they are often ignored. But they are far too import-
ant for that, as is suggested by the fact that they are 
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estimated in ordinary times to take somewhere in the 
neighbourhood of a half of the annual product of the 
metal. We must always remember that the demand 
tends to increase as people become richer and more 
numerous, that it tends to decrease as security grows 
and the habit of keeping hidden hoards decays, and 
that it varies with industrial discovery, as for example, 
the invention of gold plates in dentistry, which 
increased the demand, and the invention of vulcanite 
plates, which diminished it. Further we must note 
that for many industrial uses the demand is extra-
ordinarily elastic, since if gold were cheaper its use 
would be extended enormously—if it were cheap 
enough an enormous number of poor people who 
now have no gold ornaments would have some, and if 
it were cheaper still it would be largely used for 
roofing houses. 
The demand for gold for purposes of currency is 
more difficult to deal with, owing to our being accus-
tomed to think of demanding other things in exchange 
for currency rather than of demanding currency in 
exchange for other things, and also, perhaps, owing 
to our habit of taking examples of demand in con-
nexion with commodities quickly consumed, like 
wheat, rather than commodities which only perish 
slowly, like houses. If we can shake ourselves loose 
from the effect of these habits, we shall soon find the 
subject less anomalous than it is often supposed to be. 
The amount of metallic money in existence at any 
one moment of time is the sum of the amounts in the 
possession of individuals and institutions at that 
moment. It cannot grow larger without an increase 
either in the number of individuals and institutions 
who have holdings or an increase in the average 
magnitude of the single holding. Other things being 
equal, therefore, an increase in the numbers of 
persons and institutions with separate holdings will 
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increase the aggregate demand for coin in just the 
same way as, other things being equal, an increase 
in the number of persons with separate houses will 
increase the demand for houses. Such an increase 
may of course be brought about by an increase of 
population if the additional numbers do not consist 
entirely of very small children, very infirm or aged 
persons, paupers and others who have no separate 
holdings of coin. That qualification suggests that 
an increase may also be brought about by increasing 
the proportion of the people having separate holdings 
and by increasing the number of institutions with 
separate holdings : for example, when a number of 
old people were taken out of the workhouses and 
given money upon which to maintain themselves, a 
large number of new holdings were created, each 
old-age pensioner now having his little stock : and 
when a new company for supplying anything is 
established, a fresh separate holding of coin is almost 
always set up. This part of the subject presents no 
difficulty. 
Given the number of separate holdings, the aggre-
g a t e amount of coin will depend on the magnitude 
of the average separate holding. The foundation 
of a person's or an institution's want of such a 
holding of coin is easy to see : it is the necessity or 
convenience of having means of payment at hand. 
The prudent shopkeeper takes care not to leave his 
till wholly without coin, because he fears a customer 
may walk out in a huff if he has to say he has " no 
change " ; the prudent housewife must have enough 
coin all through Sunday (when she may be spending 
nothing beyond id. or 3d. to the church collection) to 
pay for last week's washing when the cart calls for 
this week's early on Monday ; the prudent citizen 
does not literally invest his last penny in War-bonds 
as requested by the War-Savings Committee, because 
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he wants the services of the bus or tram on the way 
home. 
Before the introduction of paper currencies and 
methods of setting one payment against another 
provided by such machinery as bills of exchange and 
banks, the magnitude of the want for these stocks 
of coin, must have depended largely on the amounts 
of money which the holder had to spend in the year 
and on the length of the periods for which payments 
such as rent and wages were made. A rich landlord 
with a large rent roll would be likely to have a bigger 
amount of coin in his possession at any time than the 
landlord with a small rent-roll. The richer man 
would receive £500 each quarter day, and gradually 
use that sum up till the next quarter came round : 
the poorer would do the same with the ¿100 he 
received at the quarter, and so would always have 
only about one-fifth as much in hand as the other. 
The farmer who paid £25 a quarter would be likely 
to have much less coin in hand for some time before 
quarter day than a neighbour who paid £100. So, 
too, any manufacturer who had large sums to pay 
in wages at fortnightly intervals would have to hold 
for at least a considerable part of the fortnight more 
coin than his neighbour who had only a small wages 
bill to provide for. And supposing a custom came 
in of paying rents only twice a year instead of four 
times, both the landlord and the farmer would have 
to keep more coin by them on the average : and if 
weekly wages became the custom in place of fort-
nightly, both employers and workmen would have to 
keep less by them on the average, as their stocks 
would be replenished more frequently. Further, if 
money became less valuable, so that more must be 
paid as the rent of any particular farm or the wages of 
any particular man, larger stocks of coin would be 
needed. 
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Nowadays the situation is very different. Methods 
of setting one payment against another through 
banking and other agencies have done away with the 
necessity of a tenant holding an amount of coin in 
preparation for paying his rent and gradually increas-
ing it as quarter day draws nearer, and also with the 
necessity of landlords holding a large amount of coin 
after quarter day and letting it down only gradually 
during the quarter. The rent is paid by a bank 
writing certain figures in its books which enable the 
landlord instead of the tenant to draw out the sum : 
the bank does not keep one stock of coin for the 
tenant and another for the landlord ; both stocks 
are dispensed with. Even when there were no £i 
and xos. notes, the firm that had to pay £1,000 in 
wages did not in modern times have to accumulate 
£T,OOO gradually throughout the week before pay 
day, but simply sent a clerk to the bank for the money 
an hour or two before it was paid out. 
Paper currencies containing notes of small denomin-
ation have obviously relieved every one except banks 
and governments of the necessity of holding coin 
unless in preparation for paying sums under the 
amount of the smallest note. Coin is only wanted as 
'' the change " of a note, m e n there are ten-shilling 
notes in circulation, the private person however rich 
does not want more than about 7s. in coin, and a poor 
person, unless he is very poor indeed, will have just 
as much. Firms which have to pay large sums in 
wages do not want any coin to pay those men who 
receive multiples of 10s. They only want coin to pay 
the surpluses over multiples of 10s. The conse-
quence is that, when the amounts held by govern-
ments and banks are left out of account, the magnitude 
of the average holding of coin depends almost entirely 
on the magnitude of the smallest note which is 
allowed by law and is generally acceptable. If £5 
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is the lowest note, a great deal of coin will be required, 
if £1 or 10s. much less, and if a dollar, still less. 
Increases of income will make no difference except 
in so far as they go to the very poorest class : longer 
or shorter intervals between periodical payments 
will only make this difference, t h a t " change " i s less 
likely to be required in payments made at longer 
intervals, since salaries, rents and other payments | 
are more likely to be for multiples of the smallest 
note when they are paid at long intervals than when 
paid at short ones. Diminution in the value of 
money (higher prices) will not greatly tend to increase 
the want for coin, since it is not in the least likely 
to cause a withdrawal of the smallest note from 
circulation, and when prices are higher, more things 
will be in the region where purchases are made by 
notes : given that ten-shilling notes are in circulation, 
and are to continue in circulation, doubling prices 
will not make people want many more half-crowns 
or other silver coins and will make them want fewer 
halfpennies. 
How much coin will be held by the governments 
which issue paper currency and b y banks, whether they 
issue bank-notes or not, actually depends at present 
not so much on what would be thought necessary 
or desirable by a dispassionate and well-informed 
observer who could feel confidence that his opinion 
would be accepted by all, as on the decision arrived 
at by government and banking authorities, who 
often accept wholly erroneous theories, and who have 
to be guided to a large extent by the erroneous 
theories held by the public even when they do not 
accept them. So we find in different countries very 
different amounts of coin held " in reserve " against 
liabilities which seem on the face of them very much 
the same, and very great changes in quite short 
periods. In practice therefore in modern times, 
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any considerable and rapid change in the currency 
part of the want for the precious metals, especially 
gold, comes from change in the policy of governments. 
A t one moment a government will accumulate 
enormous sums in gold to impress its subjects or its 
enemies with an appearance of solvency, and a few 
years after it will spend the whole. For a century 
a government will prohibit the issue of notes under 
£5 and prescribe that gold must be kept against all 
notes issued above a total of £20,000,000 or so, and 
then will itself issue £1 and 10s. notes and multiply 
the issue b y six without increasing the reserve 
at all. 
Some find a great difficulty at this pomt. They 
say they can appreciate in the abstract the argument 
that increased want for coin and for the metal of 
which the coin is composed must tend to raise the 
value of both the coin and the uncoined metal, but 
that they cannot see how the result comes about. 
If more gold is wanted for dental plates, it seems 
reasonable to expect that more will have to be paid 
for it, but then it is paid for in gold sovereigns, and 
cannot be worth more than before in them, for the 
two are the same thing ; so, too, if more coin is 
wanted it is all very well to expect it to rise in 
value, but how can it, seeing that you only give other 
money for it, which money is equivalent to it ? 
The answer is that we do not in fact buy gold with 
gold or coin with coin or even with money. We 
obtain the gold or coin we want by giving other 
commodities or services in exchange for them. If 
I, a private person, wish to increase my average 
holding of coin from £5 to £10, I cannot do it without 
somehow or other sacrificing, giving up, not money 
but other goods or services. I must work harder 
and earn more, or I must reduce my expenditure, or 
I must reduce my savings and consequently have 
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less goods of some sort or other. If I give £5 for 
the gold in a dental plate and a gold watch and chain, 
just in the same way I must give up some commodities 
or services for the £5, so that I am really exchanging 
these for the plate and watch and chain.1 So even 
more obviously of any large aggregate of persons. 
If the people of India individually or the Government 
of India decide that they will keep a larger stock of 
gold or silver, they must obtain it by giving goods or 
services in exchange for it, as they have been doing 
for centuries. 
If this is not found sufficiently convincing let us 
think of the converse case, in which a person sells his 
gold ornaments or reduces his stock of coin. Does 
he not then increase the demand for commodities 
other than gold as compared with the demand for 
gold ? During a coal shortage I sold some gold orna-
ments, and immediately expended the money pro-
ceeds in the purchase of wood for fuel. Must not 
this have tended to make the demand for gold less 
and the demand for wood greater than if I had 
continued to keep the ornaments in a drawer and 
gone without a fire ? So, too, if I had arranged by 
good management to reduce my stock of coin by 
£1, could I not have spent that £1 on something that 
I wanted, and would not this have tended to diminish 
the value of gold and increase the demand for the 
thing that I bought and therefore for things other 
than gold ? To buy gold with gold would be as 
futile as to buy wheat with w h e a t ; whenever we get 
gold by giving something else for it we tend to increase 
the demand for it, and consequently to increase its 
value : whenever we give gold for something else 
1 I h a v e t h o u g h t i t best not to encumber t h e t e x t w i t h t h e 
suggestion t h a t X m a y get t h e coin s imply b y reducing m y 
balance a t t h e bank. If I do this it means s imply t h a t I drive 
a harder bargain w i t h t h e bank and t h e banker instead of me 
has to sacrifice something. 
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we tend to diminish the demand for it and conse-
quently to reduce its value. For the most part every 
week or month or year we give as much as we get, 
and the temporary ups and downs of our stocks 
cancel each other quickly; but when we increase 
our holding for good or diminish it for good we 
exercise a permanent influence. 
The exposition so far given may seem to leave no 
place for the theory of value being connected with 
marginal utility, as taught in the economic text-
books in regard to ordinary commodities. But 
marginal utility plays just the same part with regard 
to gold (both for ordinary purposes and for currency) 
as it does with other commodities. The lower the 
value of gold, the lower will be the uses to which 
it will be put, and the poorer will be the classes of 
people who are able to use it ; as has been suggested 
above, if gold were cheap enough, it would be used 
for roofs, and many people who do not have things 
which are now made of gold because they cannot 
afford them would have them. This is really easy 
enough to understand, but it may be a little difficult 
to see how the marginal utility theory applies to 
currency. Can we say that the value of sovereigns 
falls as they become more plentiful and their marginal 
utility diminishes ? Where is the marginal purchaser 
or the marginal purchase ? Where the elasticity of 
demand ? The answer is that the difficulty we feel 
is only the result of the strangeness of estimating 
the value of sovereigns in other things instead of, as 
usual, the value of other things in sovereigns. The 
marginal purchaser is the man who is only just 
convinced, or in practice in modern times the bank 
or Government which is only just convinced, of the 
desirability of increasing or diminishing the stock of 
coin in hand, just as the marginal purchaser of house 
room is the man who is only just convinced of the 
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desirability of paying for more accommodation. The 
marginal purchase is the increase or decrease which 
some one is only just persuaded to m a k e ; and the 
elasticity of demand comes in because greater cheap-
ness of the coin will persuade people or govern-
ments to go further in their purchases of it, and 
persuade them to go much further or only a little 
further according to circumstances. Possible econo-
mies in use and the competition of available sub-
stitutes play just the same part as they do in regard 
to ordinary commodities. Demand is checked by 
the rise of value just as in the case of other 
things. 
The supply side of the problem of the value of the 
precious metals is no more anomalous than the 
demand side. 
Gold and silver are produced like other things, 
because the producers want to get money. But it 
is just as true here as elsewhere that people only 
want money in order to buy other things with it, so 
that their real aim is the acquisition of these other 
things and services. Thus though they produce gold 
in exchange for money, which may be gold, or based 
on gold, they are really exchanging it for other commo-
dities and services. There is nothing mysterious 
about the way gold comes from the sources of supply 
into the hands of the people, either as currency or as 
other things made of gold. It is exchanged for 
commodities and services just like coal or any other 
mineral. The workers earn bread and meat and 
other things by their labour in producing it just like 
workers m other industries. The owners of the 
machinery employed obtain profits and with these 
profits buy the things which they want in just the 
same way as the owners of machinery employed in 
other ways. The owners of the mines or other 
sources of supply sometimes live in luxury in Park 
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Lane and sometimes starve in Soho or on unproduc-
tive and unhealthy diggings, but all that they do get 
is got in the same w a y — b y exchange of gold for 
money which is immediately paid away for other 
commodities and services—these being the real thing 
ultimately got in exchange. Every ounce of gold 
coming into the commercial world is exchanged for— 
" sold," if we may turn the word round to signify 
its converse—for commodities and services other than 
gold, and when plentiful in relation to them, it will 
tend to be of smaller value—will be cheaper—than 
when it is less plentiful. The truth of this is illus-
trated by the high prices of commodities and services 
in newly discovered or inaccessible gold-producing 
areas. In an area in which gold has only just been 
discovered gold will be of small value (general prices 
will be high) because it is plentiful there in compari-
son with commodities which have to be brought 
there, and with services which have to be performed 
by persons brought there: if the area is easily 
accessible, this will only be temporary, for the high 
prices and earnings will speedily attract commodities 
and workers. But if the area is and continues to be 
difficult of access from the rest of the world, like the 
Australian goldfield of the eighteen-fifties, and the 
Transvaal and the Yukon later, the value of gold 
will remain lower (general prices will remain higher) 
there than in the old-settled thickly peopled parts of 
the world because the supply of commodities and 
workers to the area will remain restricted by the cost 
of getting them there. If any one doubts this explan-
ation he has only to ask himself whether he believes 
that if goldfields like those of Australia and the Yukon 
had been discovered in Yorkshire or on the banks of 
the Rhine or the Hudson, there would have been any 
long continuance of much higher prices in the imme-
diate neighbourhood than in the rest of the world. 
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Obviously there would not, and the reason would be 
that the services and commodities would soon be 
present in sufficient quantities to equalize matters. 
When gold mining was carried on in so speculative 
a manner as it was till quite recent times, people were 
tempted to think that cost of production had little 
or nothing to do with the value of gold. But now we 
hear of mines on the margin which cannot be worked 
if the prices of commodities and services continue 
so high. This simply means that they cannot be 
worked when gold is so cheap. We are sometimes 
told that gold is unlike other commodities in the fact 
that the stock is so large in comparison with the 
annual output, and this is put forward to justify 
regarding the value of gold as being not affected by 
the cost of production like that of other commodi-
ties^ But there are other commodities besides the 
precious metals, for example, houses, of which the 
stock is large in proportion to the annual output, and 
no one thinks of suggesting that cost of production 
does not play its usual part in relation to these. 
Producers of gold sometimes reap large profits and 
sometimes small profits, and so do producers of 
houses. A largely increased demand for gold cannot 
be satisfied rapidly, neither can a largely increased 
demand for houses. Double the output of plums in 
any one year, and you will enormously reduce the 
value of plums : double the annual output of gold 
or houses and you will produce nothing like as much 
effect. 
Anticipation, correct and incorrect, plays the same 
part in regard to the value of gold as in regard to that 
of other things. The terms on which people exchange 
things depend not on what is, but on what the 
exchangers believe. About the present they are 
often misinformed, but their mistakes soon appear 
and mostly cancel each other ; about the future they 
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can only speculate, some time must elapse before the 
truth appears, and the mistakes are often mostly in 
one direction so that they do not cancel each other. 
Now the price of a thing at any moment is con-
stantly influenced by anticipations of what the de-
mand for and the supply of the thing is going to be 
in the future, and the more durable the thing is. the 
more important are the effects of these anticipations 
likely to be. Thus plums were not a penny cheaper 
in the summer of 1918 because next year's crop was 
universally expected to be much larger. But when 
any one is in search of a house, not to rent for a short 
time but to buy for good and all, he finds himself 
met immediately by the owner's views about the 
demand for and supply of houses " after the war," 
and many years after it. If there is general agreement 
that the demand for houses will be good and the 
supply poor for many years, the value of houses will 
be higher than if the contrary is the case, whatever 
the present quantity of houses and whatever the 
present desire of persons for house-room and whatever 
their number and their means to pay for what they 
desire may be. It is just the same with gold as with 
houses, except that there is perhaps a little more 
probability of general error in one direction or the 
other in consequence of the widespread impression 
that gold is invariable in value. In considering 
whether to buy iron or any non-precious metal, and 
even a precious metal which is not the standard 
metal, men think of the future demand for and supply 
of that particular metal, because they think that 
these factors will settle its future price : but they will 
think nothing about the future value of the gold they 
are going to give for the iron. Estimates of the 
future value of gold, if made at all, are made quite 
unconsciously in the estimates which are formed of 
the likelihood of a general rise or fall of prices. If 
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people think there is going to be a general rise of 
prices they think—without knowing i t—that gold is 
going to fall in value, and act accordingly. Their 
joint judgment is more likely to be wrong than their 
joint judgment about iron or tin or houses because 
they do not take the particular circumstances affect-
ing the commodity into consideration. This is per-
haps the explanation of the fact that at one period 
for no definite discoverable reason people generally 
overestimate the prices of the future and therefore 
cause a boom in the prices of the present with the 
result of subsequent fall and depression. 
Whatever the cause of a boom, the high prices 
which mark it are synonymous with a low value of 
gold, which seems in strange contradiction with the 
ordinary view that in a boom " every one wants 
money." But the contradiction disappears if we 
bethink ourselves what every one wants the money 
f o r : it is to buy commodities and services in 
hopes of making a profit because " things are going 
up." People may want money, but they only want 
it because they want commodities and services; 
the fact that commodities are supposed to be going 
up makes it desirable to lay money out on them at 
once : if the money is kept, it will not buy so much. 
The pressure is not to add to money stocks by selling, 
but to deplete the stocks of money by buying as far 
as can be done without too great inconvenience and 
risk. Individuals and banks will try their hardest 
to carry on with the smallest possible stocks of gold, 
when gold is the one important thing which they do 
not expect to rise in value. 
Thus, even if every one always paid in gold for 
everything immediately on receiving it, a preponder-
ance of expectation of higher general prices (lower 
value of gold) in the future would to some extent 
raise general prices (lower the value of gold) in the 
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present. But people do not always pay on delivery : 
they frequently induce the seller to let them have the 
goods on condition that they will pay some time (in 
all important cases vat some definite time), after 
delivery. The seller then gives the goods for nothing 
at the moment because he contracts to receive a 
certain agreed sum of gold at the agreed future 
date. The buyer of the goods contracts to deliver 
this gold at the future date. If both buyers and 
sellers are influenced by some wave of sentiment 
which makes them believe prices will go higher, the 
prices at which these contracts are concluded will be 
higher, whether there is any justification for the belief 
or not. 
History shows that war raises prices (lowers the 
value of gold), and this seems very surprising to 
those who regard gold as the sinews of war. If it 
is the sinews of war, they think, it should rise, not 
fa l l ; all belligerents seem to want money very badly, 
and gold is the best kind of money and that which 
they seem to want most. But all this is fallacious ; 
money is not the sinews of war, and what the belli-
gerents want is not money but various things which 
they hope money will buy. In their hurry to get 
munitions they are ready to pay away all the money 
they can acquire by taxes or by promising to pay 
money (with interest and very likely a premium) at 
some future date. Far from prizing money more than 
usual in comparison with commodities and services, 
they shovel out money and promises to pay money 
with far less reluctance than in times of peace. As 
for the special utility of gold, that metal is one of the 
few which are of no direct use for military purposes. 
A belligerent may sometimes think it useful to parade 
a large stock of it, as the German Government has 
done during the war, because owing to the erroneous 
beliefs of the public this may comfort his subjects 
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and disturb his enemies, but if clever and unscrupu-
lous, he will arrange that very little of the apparent 
stock is real gold. Nearly every belligerent scrapes 
together every atom of gold he can get from the 
currency and elsewhere and sends it into neutral 
countries to purchase the things which he wants so 
much more. Hence it is perfectly natural that gold 
should lose value and that the general level of prices 
should rise in the countries which have and retain 
a money system in which the unit of account is 
equivalent to a quantity of gold bullion. 
Thus the conclusion to which this section of our 
inquiry has led us is that where the unit of account in 
money reckonings is either a fixed quantity of free 
metal (e.g. gold) or a coin equivalent to such a 
quantity, the value of money (and therefore the 
general level of prices) depends on the value of the 
metal, which is determined in the same way as that 
of other commodities b y the same kinds of influences 
acting on demand and supply. 
§ 4. The value of money or general level of prices where 
the unit of account is a coin of which the issue is 
limited. 
So much for the simplest monetary system, in 
which the unit of account is literally or in effect a 
definite weight of a certain metal. The system which 
can be most conveniently taken next is that in which 
the unit of account is still a coin, but a coin the value 
of which is not indeed wholly divorced, but is to some 
extent separated from the value of the bullion of 
which it is made. 
The coinage of a particular metal may be " free," 
in the sense that any one may insist on having any 
amount of that metal coined for him by the Mint, 
without being gratuitous or done without charge. 
After all. we may reflect, coin is a manufactured 
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article, and why should it alone be manufactured for 
nothing ? W h y should not people who want coin 
pay for the cost of making it up as well as for the raw 
material, just as they pay for the making of flour 
into bread and the making of white paper into a 
printed book ? Where coinage is gratuitous, it is 
always paid for out of Government revenues, because 
Government is the only agency which will do it for 
nothing. If private enterprise takes up the business 
(a thing not altogether unknown1) it will certainly 
leave the demand for coin unsatisfied till coin is 
enough above the raw material in value to make it 
worth while to manufacture it. The Government 
might act, and sometimes has acted, on the same 
principle, and make the same charge for coining 
that private enterprise might be supposed likely to 
make if under ordinary competition. Further, the 
manufacture is one very strictly monopolized : 
perhaps no other monopoly has ever been protected 
by such draconian penalties as the monopoly of 
coining. What is there to prevent governments 
from charging considerably more than the mere cost 
of coining ? Something was exacted under the name 
of " seignorage " by the seigneurs or lords who exer-
cised the right of coining in mediaeval times, and 
doubtless they would have made the percentage much 
higher if their monopoly had been secure from the 
introduction of foreign coins into their territory. 
Modern governments could probably charge more 
with safety, but have been restrained from making 
heavy charges and sometimes from making any at 
all by the reason naively suggested by the preamble 
of the statute 18 Car. II. c. 5, which established 
gratuitous coinage in England, " An Act for the 
Encouragement of Coinage." This runs: "Whereas 
1 For a fairly modern example, see Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, August , 1917. PP- 600-634. 
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it is obvious that the plenty of current coins of gold 
and silver of this kingdom is of great advantage to 
trade and commerce." 
The effect of a charge for coining is to tend to 
raise the ordinary value of the coin above that of the 
uncoined metal by the amount of the charge, just 
as any charge for the manufacture of any other 
article ordinarily raises its price by a corresponding 
amount above the value of the raw material. It 
restricts the production until the manufactured 
article is sufficiently above the value of the raw 
material to make the manufacture pay. So, for 
example, if our Mint charged 5 per cent, on the gold 
brought to it, any one who brought enough gold to 
make 100 sovereigns would only get 95 sovereigns 
in exchange for it, and in consequence no one would 
bring gold to the Mint so long as he could get more 
than 95 sovereigns—£95—for that amount of gold 
elsewhere. Whenever it was worth while to get gold 
minted it would be because the market price of gold 
was only ¿95 for the quantity out of which 100 
sovereigns were made, and when the price of gold 
is at that level it means that ninety-five sovereigns— 
£95—will buy enough gold to make 100 sovereigns, 
so that the sovereign is worth of the gold of 
which it is made, or to put it in other words, that the 
coin is worth one-nineteenth more than the gold in it. 
It cannot be more than this for any appreciable 
time, because coinage is " free," i.e. any one can 
bring as much gold as he pleases to the Mint and have 
it coined on paying the charge. So if the demand for 
coin were to increase rapidly, it would be met by a 
greater supply. On the other hand, the value of the 
sovereign might easily fall below a hundred ninety-
fifths of the gold in it for a period of some duration, 
owing to decrease of demand : new coinage would 
not take place in this period. The value could not in 
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any case fall below that of the gold in the sovereign 
because of the possibility of turning the sovereign 
into uncoined gold by the simple process of melting. 
So the effect of seignorage is to keep the value of 
the coin always between the metallic value and that 
value plus the seignorage, and in progressive and 
even in stationary periods to keep it at the higher end 
of this limited space. 
We must be careful not to be confused by changes 
in the mere form of the transaction. For a person 
to take raw material to a manufacturer to be made up 
for himself, and remunerate the manufacturer either 
by letting him keep a part of the product or by paying 
him money for the service rendered, was once a 
common method, but is now obsolete, surviving even 
at Government mints, if at all, only in name. Gold 
producers do not now bring or send their gold to a 
mint and receive back the same gold less seignorage 
and other charges, if any, but sell their gold to the 
mint (or a bank which acts as its agent) for money 
paid to them, and they regard themselves, like other 
producers, as receiving a price for their product. 
So there are " mint prices," prices given by the mint 
for gold, and when a seignorage is exacted, it appears 
in the form of a difference between the mint price 
of an ounce of gold and the amount of coin made out 
of an ounce. When, for example the mint price of 
gold is £3 xys. ioJ-i. an ounce of standard gold, that 
Is £3'&94> and an ounce of standard gold is made 
into ¿3'894 sovereigns, this shows an absence of 
seignorage : a seignorage would be introduced by 
the interposition of a gap between the mint price 
and the amount of coin made out of the ounce, 
e.g. a lowering of the mint price to £375 per oz., 
while the ounce continued to be made into 3-894 
sovereigns would yield the Government a gross 
seignorage of £0-144, °r 2s. 10 \d. per oz. 
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On the value, measured in commodities in general, 
of the metal of which the coin is made, seignorage 
has no influence except in so far as it tends to reduce 
the demand for that metal by diminishing the quantity 
taken up b y the currency, and this may be taken as 
a practically negligible effect when seignorage in only 
a single country is being considered. We need, there-
fore, scarcely encumber the exposition by making an 
allowance for the tendency of seignorage to depress 
the value of bullion : the matter is too trifling to be 
worth bringing into account. 
As seignorage is seldom or never large, and as for 
the most part it simply raises the value of the coin 
once for all and then allows it to fluctuate very nearly 
with, though a little above, the value of the bullion 
contents of the coin, we may regard it as of little 
practical importance, but it may be of considerable 
use in enabling us to understand the effects of limita-
tion in general. 
When the fact is once grasped that it is limitation 
of supply, coupled of course with sufficiency of 
demand, which enables a seignorage to keep the value 
of the coin ordinarily above the value of the metal 
of which it is composed by the amount of the seignor-
age, the way is opened for comprehension of the 
fact that by a " closing of the mint to free coinage," 
and coining only suitable amounts, coins made 
of one metal may be made to circulate at some 
value fixed by reference to coins made of another 
metal. 
This was first discovered in consequence of the very 
reasonable desire of every one to keep coins made of 
two different metals, gold and silver, both in circula-
tion at the same time, gold being convenient for 
larger and silver for smaller payments, though not 
for the smallest of all. So long as they attempted to 
maintain free coinage of both metals, governments 
IO 
MONEY 
were in perpetual difficulties arising from the fact 
that the ratios which each of them prescribed between 
their gold coins and their silver coins always sooner 
or later led to one or the other metal being not 
supplied m sufficient quantities for the requirements 
of a convenient currency. 
With regard to copper corns the principle was acted 
on long before it was recognized or understood, and 
long before it was acted on with regard to silver 
Money of small denomination was demanded, Govern-
ment did not supply the need, and, as usual, private 
enterprise stepped in. The story in this country 
is roughly that tradesmen took to issuing metal 
" tokens " for small fractions of the unit of account 
such as pennies or farthings when the Government 
did not coin them, these tokens entitling the holder 
to goods of that value at the shop of the tradesman. 
They were not always retained for further purchases 
by the customer who received them in change, but 
got into circulation, i.e. they were generally accept-
able, so that things could be bought with them from 
other people as well as from the tradesman who 
issued them, although the metal of which they were 
made was not and did not profess to be of appreciable 
value. Abuses of course soon made their appearance, 
and the business of providing these " token coins " 
was taken over by the Government. They were 
manufactured by or for the Government and given 
in exchange for larger money paid by people who 
wanted the small for purposes of their business. 
There was no " free " coinage. The metallic value 
of the coins was considerably less than that at which 
they circulated without the least difficulty, but some 
importance was attached to it, and no one seems to 
have understood that their value was given to them 
by the demand coupled with the limitation of supply 
enforced by their being sold to the public at the 
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rate of 960 farthings, 480 halfpence and 240 pennies 
to the pound sterling. 
Even when the whole coinage was remodelled in 
1816 no one seems to have thought of applying the 
same simple plan to the silver coinage, but it was 
actually applied in consequence of what seems to have 
been merely a happy accident. It was intended to 
continue " free " coinage of silver, but to make it, 
as Adam Smith had recommended forty years before, 
subject to a seignorage of 4s. per lb. troy weight 
(the Mint price being fixed at 62s. for the lb., which 
was coined into 66s.). But for some reason or other 
free coinage was only to begin after the issue of a 
proclamation about it, and the issue of this proclama-
tion was delayed. Meantime the Mint bought silver 
at the market price, coined it, and sold the coins to 
those who wanted them at the rates of 8 half-crowns, 
20 shillings and so on to the pound. This method 
being found profitable to the Mint and satisfactory 
to every one else, no one troubled about the pro-
clamation, and it was never issued. It was only 
in 1870 that the provision for free coinage after the 
issue of the proclamation was struck out of the 
Statute-book, and even then the importance of the 
change made by the disappearance of free coinage 
of silver does not seem to have been recognized. The 
usual belief seems to have been the very extraordinary 
one that the silver coins were kept in their proper 
relation to the sovereign by not being legal tender 
for more than £2, as if a disability of this kind could 
possibly have either kept the value of the coin above 
that of the metal of which it was composed or have 
kept it in circulation if the value of the metal was 
greater than the value at which the coin would circu-
late. The fact that silver coins are legal tender 
up to and not beyond £2 and that bronze coins are 
legal tender up to and not beyond £0*05 (a shilling) 
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is of no importance whatever except in so far as it 
prevents a spiteful debtor from playing arx occasional 
" nasty trick " on his creditor b y paying him a large 
sum in these coins.1 If they had not been legal 
tender at all under the law of 1816, they would 
have been generally accepted just as much as they 
are. If they had been legal tender for any amount, 
they would not have been tendered for large amounts 
any more than they are: in fact silver is seldom 
tendered for amounts above gs. 11 \d., which is less 
than a quarter of the legal maximum, and bronze 
is seldom tendered for sums above which is less 
than half the legal maximum. 
The law of legal tender has nothing to do with 
the value of the silver and the bronze coins. They 
are maintained at the fixed ratios, 20 shillings, and 
so on, to the pound sterling simply by sufficiency 
of demand coupled with adequate limitation of 
supply. When there is a demand for a thing it will 
have a value until the supply becomes great enough 
to reduce its marginal utility to ni l : what value it 
will have depends, given the particular elasticity of 
the demand, upon the magnitude of the supply. The 
value of the silver and bronze coins of the United 
Kingdom is kept at the intended ratio because the 
Government, exercising an absolute monopoly of the 
manufacture of the only known convenient media 
of exchange for small transactions, metallic coins, 
supplies them only in the limited quantity appropriate 
to that ratio. 
To make this quite clear we need only consider 
what would have been the result of insufficient 
demand or excessive supply. 
1 B u t John Leech's bus conductor who gave the tiresome 
old l a d y 4s. 10d. in coppers was quite within his rights. She 
should h a v e tendered 2d., not asked for change for a five-
shilling piece. 
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First, what would have happened if at some period 
the demand had fallen off, and that faster than the 
com is consumed by abrasion and loss ? Suppose a 
plague which carried off half the population, or an 
ingenious improvement which led to the substitution 
of some system of making small payments without 
the use of com. In that case some persons or institu-
tions, probably the banks, would have found them-
selves in possession of inconvenient amounts of silver 
and bronze c o i n ^ m o r e than they could pay out 
without annoying the persons with whom they did 
business. The probability is that they would insist 
on the Mint taking back some of the coins at the 
ratio at which they were issued, but if the Government 
obdurately refused, and the falling off in demand 
was large and expected to continue, the coins would 
go to a discount, i.e. for the sake of exchanging them 
for more convenient money people would be willing 
to submit to some loss on their nominal value, and 
they would be exchanged for the more convenient 
gold com or bank-notes at something below the 
official ratio. 
Secondly, suppose excessive supply. In order to 
placate some school of currency theorists, or in order 
simply to make more profit, the Government is not 
content with issuing silver or bronze coins when 
they are asked for by persons ready to pay the price 
but proceeds to put much larger quantities out by thé  
device of ordering Government wages and postal 
money-orders in sums up to £2 to be paid entirely 
m silver. 
The same results will follow as in case of a falling 
off of demand—there will be too much silver coin 
somewhere, and if the excess cannot be returned to 
the Mint at par the coin will eventually go to a 
discount. Additions to the supply made by illicit 
coinage will of course have exactly the same effects 
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as additions made by the Mint, and where Govern-
ment was very weak or inefficient, they might be on 
a sufficiently large scale to replace the usual Govern-
ment supply and exceed the appropriate amount, 
with the same result of bringing down the value of 
the coin, and this would go on until the value became 
so low that it would not pay the illicit manufacturers 
to produce enough to bring it still lower. The 
actual danger from illicit coinage does not appear to 
be great, owing to the fact that coinage on a large 
scale cannot be concealed, and concealed coinage on 
a small scale is not a very remunerative manufacture, 
even when the cost of the raw material is very small 
compared with that of the finished article. 
In fact the system has been perfectly successful, 
not only in this country, but wherever it has been 
tried. Some countries have made a slight improve-
ment on the English system by making the silver 
coin redeemable or " convertible " at their mints or 
Government banks. This means that the Govern-
ment is not only ready to sell the coin at the pre-
scribed ratio, but is also ready to buy it back at that 
ratio. Thus the possibility of a falling off of demand 
is provided for, and no doubt that is desirable. In 
this country there is little doubt that in case of a 
considerable falling off of demand the Government 
would be compelled to take back enough of the com 
to keep up its value, and the obligation might just 
as well be acknowledged at once. 
If the value of the metallic contents of a com of 
this kind is not originally very much below the value 
fixed for the coin, the particular arrangement made 
wiU perish in the event of a considerable rise in the 
market price of the metal of which the com is made. 
This will happen because the metallic contents of the 
coin will then be worth more than the value at which 
the coin is rated and circulates, and the cheapest 
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source of supply to any one who wants the metal 
for industrial purposes will be the coinage. Thus if 
silver went up to more than 66d. the oz. troy, instead 
of buying silver in the bullion market manufacturers 
of silver goods in this country and elsewhere would 
as far as possible get what they wanted by melting 
English silver coins, which as coins are only worth 
66d. the oz.troy, and which they could therefore get 
at that price in small quantities, and at a very little 
more than that price in large quantities. The silver 
coinage would disappear, and every one would be 
inconvenienced till some substitute equally good was 
discovered : in some countries this inconvenience has 
actually occurred. The way to prevent it is for the 
Government to take time by the forelock and issue 
a lower weighted (or more alloyed) silver coinage 
before the depletion of the coinage begins, and to 
draw in as fast as possible the old heavier (or purer) 
coin. If this is done sufficiently promptly a balance 
of silver will remain in the hands of the Government 
and no one will be hurt.1 
There is no necessity for a whole series of coins of 
this character to contain the same proportion of 
metal to their coin value, and it is often convenient 
that they should not. This was recognized when to 
make them more portable our pennies were made 
less than double the weight of the half-pennies, and 
it might well be recognized still further by making 
the half-crowns and florins smaller in proportion to 
the sixpences. The convenience of this is suggested 
by the fact that the threepenny piece appears to be 
going out of circulation because it is too small to be 
conveniently handled, and the crown because it is too 
bulky. in, 
1 A f t e r this paragraph was written the price of silver rose 
greatly and m the session of 1920 parl iament authorised the 
issue of si lver coins alloyed fifty per cent. 
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Nor is there any reason why such coins should not, 
when convenience suggests it, be made of the same 
metal as the standard coin. When Lord Randolph 
Churchill was Chancellor of the Exchequer it was 
proposed to reduce the metallic contents of the half-
sovereign, while keeping it in circulation at the 
rate of two to the pound. The coin is subject to a large 
amount of abrasion, and it was thought it might as 
well contribute towards its own maintenance, so to 
speak, by being issued in the first place at a profit. 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century this 
principle that sufficiency of demand and properly 
limited supply will keep the value of a coin above 
that of its metallic contents was applied to standard 
coin in several parts of the world, of which India was 
the most important. 
The Indian Government was troubled in various 
ways, unnecessary to describe, by the change in the 
ratio of value between gold and silver. The standard 
was silver, and a silver coin, the rupee, was the unit 
of account. The ratio of value which had prevailed 
for a long time between the value of gold and silver 
in the markets of the world made the value of the 
rupee to the gold sovereign or pound sterling about 
10 to i , so that in ordinary language in England 
the rupee was said to be about 2s., while in India 
the pound was said to be 10 rupees. But the ratio 
was rapidly changing, so that it was said in England 
that the rupee was falling, and in India that the 
pound was rising. The Indian Government wished to 
stop this movement, and also to link up India with 
the Western world, in which the gold standard was 
predominant. After some resistance on the part of 
the British Government, it was allowed to adopt a 
scheme under which the supply of rupees to the 
currency was to be so restricted as to keep their 
value up to the ratio of 15 to the £1. The possi-
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bility of the ratio between silver and gold varying 
again so as to make the metallic contents of the rupee 
equal to more than one-fifteenth of £i was recognized, 
but was not regarded as an objection, inasmuch as 
one of the subjects of the change was to keep the 
rupee higher than it otherwise would be. If it went 
higher than 15 to the £1 the new system would 
simply disappear because no longer necessary. There 
would be no melting down of the silver coinage, as 
there would in similar circumstances in England, 
because there would be no gold currency in the way 
to prevent the coined rupee rising in value along 
with silver. 
Some of the older economists and financiers of the 
time said the scheme could not possibly work, and 
were greatly pleased when their prophecies seemed to 
be justified by the failure of the rupee to stand 
immediately at the intended rate. But this was only 
the natural consequence of insufficiency of demand : 
the demand was not at first big enough to make the 
mere stoppage of new coinage bring the value up to 
the ratio. Soon, however, demand increased, and 
gradually increased enough to overcome the counter-
acting effect of some new supply in the shape of 
rupees which were outside India and now came back 
because they were worth more there than outside : 
the rupee rose in relation to gold so that merchants 
in India and England were able to do business approxi-
mately at the ratio of 15 rupees to the £1, and the 
Indian Government could pay approximately ¿1 due 
from it with 15 rupees. And little difficulty was 
found in maintaining that ratio. 
The rupee consequently came to be one-fifteenth 
of a pound just for the same reason as the English 
shilling is one-twentieth of a pound—there was a 
sufficient demand for it and not too much supply. 
The difference was that in India there was no gold 
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sovereign in circulation, so that the ratio fixed for 
the rupee was not with a domestic coin but with one 
circulating in another country, and could therefore 
only be seen at work in the business transactions 
between the two countries, commonly called the 
exchanges. Hence the name " gold-exchange stan-
dard " applied to the monetary system of India 
and other countries with silver currencies kept to the 
standard of gold. But we must beware of imagining 
any natural pre-eminence of gold over silver. The 
same system might be applied with equal ease to 
keeping the value of a gold coin at some fixed ratio 
with the value of the silver coin of another country 
or indeed with the value of any other clearly cognizable 
commodity or even with a collection of commodities 
such as appears in the formation of an index number 
of prices. This was perceived by the Swedish Govern-
ment during the War. Being desirous of exempting 
Sweden from further rise of prices, it took some steps 
to hinder the further entry of gold into the currency 
and therefore to hold up the value of the gold com 
in which prices were reckoned above the value of 
unregulated gold in the world at large. No definite 
standard was adopted, but the intention obviously 
was to keep the value of money from falling further, 
or at any rate from falling so much m relation to 
commodities in general. 
The conclusion of this section is that given demand 
for a coin, adequate restriction of supply will keep 
its value up to any required level above that of its 
metallic contents. It is not, of course a useful 
corollary of this to say that adequate additions to 
supply would keep its value down to any required 
level below that of its metallic contents: that is 
perfectly true, but adequate additions cannot be 
made because a coin worth less as a com than the 
bullion of which it is made will always, law or no law, 
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ultimately be melted to be turned into something 
else. Consequently where the unit of account is a 
coin regulated in supply, the value of money is never 
lower, may by chance occasionally be equal to, and is 
ordinarily higher than it would be under free and 
gratuitous coinage. How much higher depends on 
the particular standard of restriction adopted : it 
may be higher by a given percentage ; it may be 
higher by the amount necessary to make it conform 
with the variations of some other money, as the 
Indian rupee was kept higher by the amount necessary 
to make it one-fifteenth of £i ; or it may be kept 
as much higher as the restricting authority judges 
desirable by some rough estimate, or as much higher 
as will preserve stability of value as indicated by some 
index number of prices. 
It is no objection to this conclusion to say that the 
value of a coin restricted in supply may be reduced by 
the competition of paper currency. That is merely 
one of the numerous things which tend to reduce the 
demand for the coin, and may make the demand 
insufficient to keep its value over that of its bullion 
contents. The case will come under notice again in 
the course of the argument of the next section. 
§ 5. The value of money or general level of •prices where 
the unit of account is a bank-note or currency note. 
In modern times metal discs stamped with certain 
designs and lettering are not the only things with 
which people buy and for which they sell. They also 
use scraps of paper on which are figures or words (or 
both for safety) indicating amounts of the unit of 
account, for example " £1," " Ten shillings " (which 
is half a pound sterling). There is usually other 
reading matter on the scraps, but it is not commonly 
read or regarded as of any more importance than 
(what is to most people quite unintelligible) the 
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" DEI GRA : BRITT : OMN : REX FID : DEF : IND : 
IMP : " round the King's head on our coins. Pro-
vided the paper will be taken for the amount printed 
conspicuously on its face, wherever we are likely to 
offer it, we do not trouble ourselves whether, like a 
bank-note, it carries the promise of some person or 
institution to pay that sum at a particular place on 
demand (scil. in business hours), or, like a currency 
note, says that it is legal tender (i.e. that we can 
compel any one to whom we owe the sum to choose 
between accepting the paper in discharge of the debt 
and going without payment altogether). 
How such " notes " first got into circulation along 
with coins in various countries and at different 
times is an interesting historical question well worth 
studying. But the answer is lengthy and not material 
to our present purpose. It will suffice to suggest a 
few of the reasons why a demand arose for such a 
currency. Sometimes the demand arose from the 
bad state of the coinage. When base coin was 
common and originally good coins were liable to be 
much clipped without immediately being rejected by 
the next person to whom they were offered, and when 
all sorts of good and bad foreign coins found their way 
into each country, the inexpert person never knew 
what he would actually get if he accepted say £50 or 
£100 tendered to him by a buyer or a debtor, and 
even an expert would take some time examining, 
weighing, and perhaps assaying some of the coins. 
What more natural in such circumstances than that 
a person, having once got a quantity of coin, should 
hand it over to some expert man or institution with 
a reputation for honesty to be examined and certified 
as amounting to a certain sum ? And then what 
more natural than that having got the certificate 
he should use it instead of the coin itself to make his 
next big payment with ? Instead of offering a 
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doubtful heap of metal which may or may not amount 
to what he says it does, he is able to offer a certificate 
or note which will entitle the holder who accepts it 
to something much more definite : all that is required 
is that the certificate or note should be made out in 
such a form that handing it over from one person to 
another—delivery—will transfer the ownership of the 
certified quantity of money, and the certificate is 
then an actually better medium of exchange than the 
coin itself, and there is very naturally a demand for 
it, it becomes generally acceptable, it is " paper 
currency." 
But even if the coinage is above reproach, a demand 
for paper currency can scarcely fail to arise. To keep 
a large amount of money in coin is to keep a bulky 
article which offers peculiar attraction to thieves on 
account of its retaining its value when it has 
lost its form, so that it cannot be identified. It is 
natural that any man who has no convenient 
strong-room will wish to deposit any considerable sum 
in some safe place and take a receipt for i t ; as one 
good coin is as good as another, he will not ask the 
person with whom he deposits the coin to promise to 
give him back the actual coins deposited—a promise 
to pay " the sum " deposited will suffice. Provided 
the written promise is in such a form that handing it 
over will transfer the owner's claim on the person who 
has the coin to the new holder, it is evident that when 
the owner wants to make a large payment he will do 
well to hand over the promise instead of fetching out 
the coin from deposit, and the person whom he is 
paying will do well to accept it. It will clearly be 
convenient in view of such possibilities that the 
person with whom the coin is deposited should make 
out his promises to pay in round sums—£20, £100, 
and so on, so that several may be pieced together to 
make up any particular payment. When this is 
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done, the promises or " notes " pass from hand to 
hand easily, become generally acceptable, are " paper 
currency." There is a demand for them because they 
are more convenient for keeping and paying large 
sums than gold, and still more than silver. They 
can be more easily stored and carried : each one is 
identifiable b y its date and number and so less 
attractive to thieves than coin. True, they are more 
easily destroyed by fire, but the honest issuer does not 
take advantage of that accident. 
The person who " issues " the notes makes his 
profit by lending out most of the coin deposited, 
knowing full well that it is vastly improbable that 
many of the note-holders will all at once want to 
exchange this new currency for the old heavy bulky 
and inconvenient coins. Bold competitors will start 
in the business : on the strength of a little capital, or 
the pretence of a capital, they will issue notes by way 
of loan to borrowers without waiting for deposits, 
and the demand is soon fully supplied. 
In some such ways redeemable notes get into 
circulation. 
At this stage it is natural to say that the notes owe 
the fact that they circulate to the fact that the issuers 
must redeem them if required. But something more 
than redeemability is required to make them circulate; 
when a note is redeemed it is at the end of its circula-
tion, and what we want to know is rather why notes 
are not presented for redemption at once instead of 
circulating. They are kept circulating not because 
they are redeemable, but because other people than 
the issuer will take them. That is, because they are 
convenient to keep in hand in order to make future 
payments wi th ; there is, in fact, a demand for this 
kind of medium of exchange, so that people like to 
have it in preference to an equal amount of coin. 
That redeemability, or " convertibility " as it is 
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commonly called, is not essential in order to make 
notes circulate is shown b y the fact that notes which 
the issuers will not in fact redeem and which are 
therefore called " inconvertible " notes will circulate, 
and an inquiry for the cause of their circulation 
shows it to be a demand, although often what is 
called " an artificially created demand," for notes. 
In order to be able to put convertible notes into 
circulation an individual, or company of individuals, 
must have a considerable reputation for solvency. 
Notes not payable on demand but only payable at 
some future date without interest will not be accepted 
even from a solvent person or institution at their face 
value, and if issued at a discount so that they bring 
interest, they will not pass from hand to hand like 
coin and ordinary notes, because the discount at 
which they must be taken is always diminishing. 
Notes not bearing interest and not payable either on 
demand or at any future time, if offered b y an indivi-
dual or company of the most undoubted solvency 
as something new and fresh, would only be laughed 
at. 
But when notes have got into circulation as con-
vertible notes and people have become thoroughly 
accustomed to accept them and to find them accept-
able b y others, their convertibility may sometimes 
be taken away without destroying this general 
acceptability of the notes and the consequent demand 
for them. Of course, if the public receive a rude 
shock by being told that such and such a bank is 
insolvent and its assets will not be sufficient to pay 
its notes in full, the notes will cease to be acceptable. 
But some less disquieting explanation may be given 
for " the suspension " of convertibility. If the Bank 
of England in 1797 had taken pains to make it known 
all over the country that it could not continue to pay 
gold coin for its notes on account of the insufficiency 
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of its resources, and that it did not think it could ever 
resume the practice, the notes would have ceased to 
be generally acceptable and consequently ceased to 
circulate and lost their value at one blow. But 
instead of doing that the Bank directors went to the 
Government and secured the passing of a law restrain-
ing them from redeeming their notes. The public 
thought little of this : the notes looked just the same 
as before, and continued just as convenient, and 
every one except Lord King long afterwards went on 
taking them just as before. The demand for them 
was unaffected, and the supply for the moment 
continued just, or nearly, as much limited as 
before. 
In some such way an already existing demand for a 
convertible note can be maintained for it when well-
informed people, and even much larger numbers, know 
that its convertibility has disappeared. Demand and 
limitation of supply account for an obsolete blue 
Mauritius 2d. stamp selling for a thousand pounds : 
why should they not also account for a convertible 
note retaining its old value even when it is no longer 
convertible ? The Government of Mauritius cer-
tainly does not promise to redeem the stamp at that 
or any other value and never undertook to accept 
it as payment for postage for more than 2d., but a 
dealer will give £1,000 for it because he knows he can 
pass it on for more. He will not, it is true, give £1,000 
for it if he can only sell it for that sum, while any one 
selling five pounds' worth of goods in 1797 would take 
a £5 Bank of England note, although he could not 
expect to get more than £5 for it, but the difference 
is only the result of the demand for the five pound 
note being a demand for currency, whereas the 
demand for the stamp is a demand for the satisfaction 
of collectomania. 
I t is perhaps impossible for private individuals 
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separately or in association to make a perfectly new 
issue of inconvertible notes without the assistance of 
Government, but such an issue can be made bv or 
with the active help of even a rather weak Government 
This is possible partly because the public has been 
accustomed to regard the note currency as more or 
less arranged for by the Government, and therefore 
to look upon anything which is allowed to circulate 
as being " good " — i t trusts the Government to do 
with notes what it does with coin, to see that 
nothing " bad " is in circulation—and partly because 
the Government assumes the power of interpreting 
the name of the unit of account. This power i= 
commonly called the power of changing the law of 
legal tender. A t one time, for example, gold coin 
may be the only legal tender ; then a contract to 
pay one hundred p o u n d s " can only be fulfilled 
(unless the other party agrees) by the tender of xoo 
sovereigns or 200 half-sovereigns. Government 
may then enact that notes issued by some bank or 
by its own Treasury shall be legal tender, and forth-
with everyone who has contracted to pay "pounds " 
can pay in these notes. It is true that if the issue is 
very unpopular, the mere making of it legal tender 
win not bring it into general circulation, because 
people wih find means for refusing to deal with those 
who insist on paying in it, but the law certainly 
does help. The power of the holder of a note to make 
his creditor accept it in payment is not exactly the 
same thing as the note being generally acceptable 
but it goes far to create general acceptability since 
a person's reluctance to accept is largely overcome 
b y the feeling that he can " p a s s the thing o n " 
Governments have often been helped in getting their 
notes into circulation by the fact that they hava 
forbidden private persons to issue convertible notes 
for small denominations which would have been 
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readily accepted if allowed. When desirous of 
issuing inconvertible notes themselves, they pay no 
attention to the arguments against small notes and 
thus their issue satisfies a previously existing demand. 
After this preface about the nature and origin of 
" paper currency " we come to the question, what 
effect it has on the value of the unit of account, or, in 
other words, on general prices. 
We must be careful not to fall into the mistake of 
imagining that because a note-issue circulates at a 
par with coin, as for example a five-pound Bank of 
England note before the war would readily exchange 
for five sovereigns, therefore everything in regard to 
the value of money and prices is just as it would 
be in the absence of the issue. The extent to which 
notes take the place of coin is commonly very much 
overrated. Writers have sometimes supposed that 
every issue displaced an amount of coin equal to its 
own total amount less any reserve kept against it b y 
the issuers. This is very far from being true, since the 
superior convenience of notes for the higher denomina-
tions of currency—that is for sums above five shillings 
or perhaps something rather less—leads to a much 
larger quantity of currency (coin plus notes) being 
kept on men's persons than if there are no notes. 
Nevertheless it is true that all or most note-issues 
do to some extent economize or " displace " coin, 
and thereby reduce the demand for it. We may 
certainly take it that the general tendency of note-
issues, especially when the notes are for small sums 
and therefore compete with coin much more than with 
other machinery for paying money, is to reduce the 
demand for coin, though they need not displace com 
to their full amount. 
Where the coin is restricted and has a much higher 
value than its metallic contents, a note-issue, although 
it retains its par value in coin, may thus have a 
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considerable influence upon the value of money, 
reckoned as it is in this restricted coin. For example, 
if at the time the Indian Government was bringing 
the rupee up to is. 4d. by restriction of coinage, either 
it or banks had been successful in issuing and keeping 
outstanding a large issue of notes (convertible or 
inconvertible) of small denomination, the rise of the 
rupee would have been greatly obstructed in conse-
quence of the reduction in the demand for silver 
rupees. When the scheme had attained success such 
an issue might obviously have sent the rupee down 
again to the value of its metallic contents. 
But that is not all. An issue, convertible or 
inconvertible, although circulating at par with the 
coin tends to reduce the value of the coin and raise 
prices even when that coin is like the English sover-
reign before the War, always on a level with its 
metallic contents, or like the Indian rupee in the case 
just imagined has already been driven down to a 
level with its metallic contents. It does so even 
when the coin may be melted down and exported 
because it tends to reduce the value of its metallic 
contents : the demand for coinage being reduced, 
the demand for and therefore the value of un-
coined bullion will be reduced, so that the melt-
ability of the coin will not altogether save it from being 
pulled down by the diminution of demand for it 
caused by the competition of the notes. This, how-
ever, though important in any large view of the 
subject, is negligible when the effect of a note issue 
confined to any one country is concerned : the bullion 
of which the value is depressed is a mundane commo-
dity not likely to be very appreciably affected by any 
probable single change in the demand for the coin 
of any one country. 
A t this point the power of a convertible issue to 
depress the value of money and raise prices stops, 
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provided the coin may be melted and it or bullion may 
be exported. Money is still reckoned in a coin which 
is convertible into bullion, and therefore cannot go 
below its bullion value. The conditions of the supply 
of the convertible notes prevent the-value of any of 
them from going below the value of the coin, and the 
coin cannot go below the value of its contents because 
the supply of it would then be reduced by melting. 
That the supply of the convertible notes of any 
denomination cannot be so large as to cause a gap to 
appeal- between their value and that of the coin they 
promise to pay is so obvious as to scarcely need 
explanation. If there was such a gap any one who 
had one of the notes would run to the issuers to get 
it redeemed : the note by hypothesis is circulating 
at par : a pound note pays a pound debt and buys an 
article priced at a pound, and " the change " for it 
is twenty shillings, which all the arithmetic books 
agree in making a pound. Any gap between it and 
sovereigns would therefore appear in the form of a 
sovereign being worth more than a pound, and if a 
sovereign could be openly sold for more than a pound, 
notes would be rushed in for redemption by holders 
anxious to make a profit, until parity was reached 
again, or all the notes paid off, or the issuers bankrupt 
and the notes out of circulation. Convertible notes 
thus cannot be kept outstanding in numbers which 
would lead to their being less in value than the coin 
they promise to pay, and a fortiori they cannot be 
issued in such numbers : it follows that no more can 
be put into circulation than will be compatible with 
their keeping their par value. The bankers may try 
to get more into circulation by paying all their own 
household bills with them, but if there are enough out 
already, this will only end in the tradesmen presenting 
the notes for redemption. It may occur to some 
banker before breakfast, when the intellect is weak, 
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that it would be a fine thing to encourage people to 
take his notes by offering them at a small discount, 
but after breakfast he will remember that this would 
cause an enormous demand for his notes, but that 
they would all be immediately presented for redemp-
tion so that more might be asked for and he would 
be ruined by the discount. There is, in fact, no 
possibility of the convertible note being below the 
value of the coin which it promises, and therefore it 
cannot drag the value of money—the unit of account 
of money—below the value of the bullion contents of 
the com, when that coin itself is protected by free 
convertibility into bullion from being so dragged 
down. If the freedom of owners to do what they 
liked with sovereigns which prevailed in England 
before the War had been maintained, the introduction 
of an issue of convertible one-pound notes (formerly 
forbidden) with only an ordinary reserve against 
them, would doubtless have tended to drag down the 
value of English money, i.e. of £i and all multiples 
and fractions of £i, and therefore to raise prices. 
But it would only have brought the value of the 
pound down along with gold throughout the world 
and only have raised English prices along with prices 
m the world at large. And a depression thus caused, 
though widespread, would be of trifling depth. 
An inconvertible issue has more power than a 
convertible of depressing the value of the unit of 
account and raising prices within the country where 
that unit is employed. 
Inconvertible notes may circulate at the full value 
of the bullion contents of the coin indicated on their 
face and even at the full value of the coin when it is 
restricted so as to be worth more than its bullion 
contents. The testimony of history is conclusive on 
this, and the fact is easily explained by the ordinary 
principle of demand coupled with adequate limitation 
E 
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of supply. If the Government or other issuers are 
able to prevent the manufacture, or forgery as they 
would call it, of notes by other persons, and if they 
themselves do not give out or keep out more notes of 
each denomination than would have been issued and 
kept out if the notes had been convertible, the issue 
cannot possibly have any other value than that which 
a convertible issue would have had. Just as the 
convertible issue is kept up in value by the demand 
and adequate limitation of supply, so may the incon-
vertible be kept up. 
But though they need not be any greater in total 
than convertible notes, inconvertible notes may be 
so, and even when the coin is convertible into free 
bullion, they can be issued in sufficient amount to 
press the value of money down below that of the 
bullion contents of the coin indicated by the unit of 
account. They can, for example, be issued in suffi-
cient quantities to bring the value of the English 
pound below that of the gold contents of the sover-
eign, the American dollar below that of the gold 
contents of an American gold dollar, or the Indian 
rupee below that of the contents of the Indian silver 
rupee. That this kind of thing has happened in past 
history is generally admitted, but when it happens, 
it is generally unperceived by the mass of the people 
and strenuously denied by many of those who ought 
to know. They are so accustomed to expect changes 
of the value of particular articles to be reflected in 
their money prices that they cannot understand 
general prices being higher because the measure of 
price has been changed. 
Yet the process is really simple enough. The whole 
of some issues of notes and a part of most may be 
absorbed in increasing the stocks of currency held by 
persons and institutions. The British Government 
might have stored in vaults a sovereign for every 
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pound-note which it issued, or private individuals 
might have been so pleased with the picture of the 
Houses of Parliament on the back of the notes, or so 
patriotic, that every pound-note issued was promptly 
framed and hung on front parlour walls. Then no 
additional buying of things would have taken place 
or been attempted in consequence of the issue. In 
the first of these two examples neither the British 
Government nor the people would have had a penny 
more to spend than before : in the second the Govern-
ment certainly would have more to spend but the 
people would have that much less, a n d ' t h e two 
together would have no more to spend than before 
But this is far from usual. A great part of almost 
every issue and sometimes the whole of it goes to 
increase the aggregate amount of money which 
people and Government together can and do spend 
on things and services. The notes are exchanged 
for something : the issuers buy things and services 
with them or lend or give them to others who do 
They may, if a Government, go through the farce 
of giving them in exchange for other money 
and then spending that other money instead of 
spending them directly, but however the process mav 
be disguised, it results in more money to spend and 
more money spent. The perfectly natural consequence 
is a rise of prices. Where the notes are convertible 
into com and the com is convertible into free bullion 
this rise of prices will not include a rise in the price 
of bullion since the value of the coin and bullion 
must stand on a level. The convertible notes cannot 
be issued m large enough quantities to cause a gap to 
appear between their value and that of the bullion 
to which, through the coin, they are nominally equal 
t o r example, given convertibility of coin into free 
bullion, it would be impossible to issue as many 
convertible notes as would bring up the amount of 
IO 
MONEY 
spendable money far enough to raise the price of 
fine gold from the par price of £4-25 to £575, because 
long before that happened, every one who had notes 
would be running to the issuers to get sovereigns 
with them : the sovereigns thus obtained could be 
turned into bullion, and so give the holder a larger 
amount to spend than if he spent his note. Incon-
vertible notes, not being subject to this " automatic 
check," may be issued in greater and ever greater 
quantities, so that they can cause a gap to appear 
between their value and that of the bullion to which, 
through the coin, they are nominally equal. 
At first sight it is probable that most of us would 
expect the gap to appear in the form of a note passing 
for less than its nominal value, say a pound-note 
passing for £o'8 or 16s. and a dollar-note for $o-8o. 
This does not happen, and nothing really suggests 
that it should happen. The pound-note was, and 
continues to ordinary apprehension to remain, '' a 
pound " : it will buy a thing priced in a shop-window 
at " £1," and it will pay a debt of £1. Failing the 
note going to a discount, we should perhaps expect 
the sovereign to " go to a premium," and begin to 
circulate at some value exceeding £1, say £i'25 or 
£1 5s. This might happen if people really preferred 
sovereigns to notes, and if they could shift the 
premium as fast as changes in the price of bullion 
took place, but in fact that could not be done : the 
currency value lags behind the bullion value, and 
consequently the coins are not kept in circulation 
at higher prices, but are " driven out," as it is usually 
said, by the notes. It is not really a case of their 
being driven out, but of their being attracted out 
into the bullion or export market by the premium 
obtainable there and not obtainable so long as they 
are used as currency. Jewellers and bullion dealers 
will give more for them in " m o n e y , " that is, in 
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notes, than they will fetch as currency, so that they 
" disappear," the heaviest going first, and the others 
following as the price of bullion rises. 
Thus the increase of inconvertible notes when 
carried, as it can be, far enough, causes a rise of the 
price of bullion. 
It has not till lately been well understood, even by 
experts, that when the coin is not convertible into free 
bullion, convertible notes may be issued in quantities 
just as great as inconvertible notes and with exactly 
the same result. Ricardo came near hitting on the 
fact. He noticed that during the suspension of cash 
payments by the Bank of England it was a puzzle 
to many people how the inconvertible note could be 
of less value than the gold it should (through the 
gold coin) represent, although as a matter of fact, 
when they had a gold coin they found it would only 
circulate at the same rate as prevailed before the 
suspension of convertibility.1 He explained the 
matter quite correctly as being the result of the 
legislation which prevented law-abiding people from 
doing what they liked with the coin : there were 
penalties against melting and exportation which kept 
the gold coins, so long as they were in the hands of 
law-abiding people, from being used for any purpose 
except currency, while for that particular purpose, as 
has just been shown, the coin cannot in practice be 
used at a value higher than that of the unit of account 
supposed to represent it. But Ricardo and subse-
quent writers regarded the point as of little import-
ance, because it did not occur to them that a well-
enforced denial of freedom to deal with coin would be 
sufficient by itself to allow over-issue to take place 
without the abolition of the convertibility of notes 
into coin. Recent experience has shown this to be 
1 " T h e High Price of Bull ion a proof of t h e Depreciation 
of B a n k N o t e s " in Ricardo 's Works, p. 280. 
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perfectly possible. The British Treasury's one-pound 
and ten-shilling currency notes have been convertible 
at the Bank of England, and have as a matter of fact 
been redeemed there for holders who have sometimes 
at least been required to write their names on the 
back of them and asked what they wanted the gold 
coin for. But at the same time exportation has been 
made impossible, and the using of the coin for any 
purpose except currency was forbidden, so that the 
person who goes to the Bank and receives a sovereign 
might just as well be given a round disc of cardboard 
with " legal tender for £i " on one side and Sir John 
Bradbury's head on the other, or better still, he might 
stay at home and spend his £i currency note like 
other people. The currency note can still be con-
verted into a fullweight coin and is therefore described 
as convertible, but it is no longer convertible into 
free gold of the weight of the sovereign, because the 
sovereign may not be converted into free gold. 
Thus convertibility of the note into coin is deprived 
of all its virtue when laws against melting and exporta-
tion of the coin are present and effective. Convertible 
notes can then be issued without check just like 
inconvertible notes, and consequently can drag down 
the value of money below that of the bullion contents 
of the coin and give rise to the same phenomenon, a 
rise of general prices including the price of bullion. 
When the issuers of inconvertible notes or notes 
which are only convertible into inconvertible coin 
issue them so freely that they will exchange for less 
than the par amount of bullion, when, that is, in 
other words, the price of bullion rises above the par 
price, so that the note will no longer buy raw material 
for the coin which the note represents, the unit of 
account ceases to be a coin or quantity of metal and 
becomes a printed symbol on a piece of paper the 
supply of which depends on the moderation of the 
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issuers. The pound sterling, for example, in multiples 
and fractions of which all prices in this country are 
reckoned, ceases to be 113 grains of fine gold and 
becomes simply " £ 1 " (or one-fifth of £5 and so on), 
when printed on a genuine note, and the amount of 
these symbols printed is determined by what the 
Treasury thinks fit. 
When the value of money is thus surrendered to the 
discretion of Government issuers, it usually goes down 
and the general level of prices goes up rapidly. The 
surrender usually takes place at a time of financial 
difficulty, so that the very object of destroying 
convertibility is to remove the necessity the Govern-
ment or others are under of fulfilling their promises 
to pay something equivalent to certain definite 
quantities of bullion. In the present state of economic 
instruction in all countries there is no Government 
and no people which is likely to understand what is 
happening. The issuers find that further issues 
themselves directly bring in money easily and appar-
ently cheaply, and very likely at first greatly assist 
borrowing in other ways by the feeling of ease and 
prosperity which " plenty of money " at first creates. 
Many other persons profit enormously by the rise 
in the prices of the things they sell. So there is a 
strong bias in influential quarters in favour of more 
and more notes, which leads to many arguments in 
their favour. 
1. A t first when the rise of prices is not yet very 
perceptible, it is usual to deny that general prices 
have risen. This contention soon disappears, as the 
issue goes on and prices rise further. 
2. Next comes the contention that though prices 
have risen, the currency is quite sound because it is 
still on a level with bullion—the price of bullion has 
not risen. This is untrue, but usually difficult to 
disprove, because the time is probably one of con-
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siderable confusion : transport may be interrupted 
by warlike operations so that the price at which gold 
may be bought from abroad is difficult to ascertain, 
and the issuers may have taken the precaution of 
forbidding free transactions in bullion at home. But 
soon this does not matter, because, as the issue goes 
on, the rise in the price of bullion becomes too great 
to be denied. 
3. Sometimes it is contended that a rise in the price 
of bullion is due not to a depreciation of the money but 
to an appreciation of bullion. This covers two 
different contentions between which confusion is 
frequent : 
(a) It may mean simply that bullion is higher in 
value relatively to commodities in general, while 
money has preserved its old relation to them. As the 
issue gets larger and larger, this too has to fade into 
the limbo of discarded arguments. But supposing 
it were true, it would only be by accidental coinci-
dence, unless the issue of notes was managed with the 
distinct aim of securing a currency which would 
always keep the same level of value and preserve a 
complete stability of general prices. Regulation 
with this end in view is quite conceivable, and has 
often been advocated by high authority. It must be 
noticed, however, that those who put forward this 
defence of an actual issue are often persons who would 
be the loudest in their protests against the desirability 
of the adoption of any scheme for such regulation. 
(b) The other meaning of the contention that it is 
not money which has depreciated but bullion which 
has appreciated, is that the gap between the value 
of bullion and that of the unit of account and also the 
general rise of prices are to be ascribed to something 
that has happened to bullion and ordinary com-
modities, and not to what has happened to money, and 
therefore the unit of account has not fallen in value 
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although it will buy less, than before. The answer to 
this is that it implies that value can and must pro-
perly be measured in labour cost of production instead 
of in commodities and services ; the idea is that it 
has become more difficult to get gold and other 
commodities, and therefore they are more valuable, 
and the higher price in the unit of account merely 
gives expression to this, and therefore has not been 
produced by the issue. But we do not measure, and 
we do not want to measure, value in labour-cost of 
production; if we did so measure it, everything in 
savage or primitive times when the productiveness of 
industry is very low would be of enormous value. 
So this answer would be of no use if it were true, and 
that it is seldom, if ever, true is suggested by the 
fact that it has almost always been put forward as 
one of the defences of over-issue, and it seems unlikely 
that inconvertibility and a decline in the productive-
ness of industry so often go together. 
4. The more acute Government apologists content 
themselves with alleging that the issue is only one 
of two or more causes tending to raise prices. There 
are always many causes tending to raise prices, so 
that this is sure to be true, and it does not in the 
least destroy the force of the proposition that the 
issue tends to raise prices. 
5. We now come to what is at .once the most 
insidious and the most dangerous of all the arguments 
in favour of increasing issues. This is that the 
issuers have no control over the issue and that it is 
" automatic," as it only takes place when the notes 
are asked for, so that they are " issued in response 
to a genuine demand and not forced on people." It 
might as well be claimed that the issue of pocket-
money to a child is not under the control of its 
parents because it is automatic, only taking place 
when the money is asked for. Old-age pensions, 
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when first established, might have been paid for some 
years without any addition to taxation or debt, by 
giving the pensioners a one-pound note every four 
weeks, if no reserve had been kept against the notes : 
would the pensioner's genuine demand for the notes 
have justified the statement that the issue was 
automatic and the Government had no control over 
its amount ? If an extra hundred millions war-
bonus (or peace-bonus for all the difference it makes) 
were paid by additions to the £i and ios. currency 
notes of £2,000,000 a week, would there not be 
a genuine demand for these additional notes ? If 
the Government hires schoolgirls at £2 a week to 
watch a simple machine and defrays the expense by 
giving each of them two new £1 currency notes which 
are clear additions to the amount already outstanding, 
can it be said that these girls do not exercise a genuine 
demand for the notes ? 
Every monopolist producer controls his sales, and 
the Government manufacturer of notes is no excep-
tion. The monopolist of an ordinary commodity 
can limit his sales in one of two different ways, first, 
by offering a fixed amount of the product for sale by 
auction, and so letting the consumers determine the 
price, and secondly, by offering to sell any amount 
that may be inquired for at a price fixed by himself. 
The second is the usual method : it limits the total 
sold in the long run just as effectually as the other. 
If 100,000 bottles of some patent medicine can be 
sold at 3s. each, while 110,000 could scarcely be sold 
at 2s. 6d. and only 70,000 could be sold at 3s. 6d., it 
is all the same whether the monopolist says he will 
sell 100,000 bottles a year for what they will fetch, 
or says the price is 3s. and any one who likes can have 
a bottle at that rate. Just so with notes. The 
monopolist producers of notes control the issue either 
by saying they will issue such and such an amount, 
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or by fixing the price and selling as many as are 
demanded at that price. 
The first method of limitation is easily understood : 
the producers enforce the limitation simply by not 
printing notes (and not allowing any one else to print 
them) beyond the prescribed number. The second 
method is enforced when notes are convertible into 
bullion, because that, as has been explained, fixes for 
them a price" or value in bullion below which notes 
cannot be issued. When convertibility into bullion 
is absent, the price might be fixed in some other 
commodity than bullion—in lead for example, or 
rubber of some well-known quality. The issuers 
might be bound by law to give a certain number of 
pounds avoirdupois of lead or rubber in exchange for 
any note presented to them for redemption. But 
this would be re-establishing convertibility in the 
form of convertibility into lead or rubber instead of 
convertibility into bullion, and gold certainly will 
not be dethroned to make lead or rubber or any 
other single commodity reign as the standard of 
value. The only standard possibly superior to 
bullion is commodities in general. Actual conver-
tibility of the note into commodities in general is 
impracticable: the Bank of England could not be 
asked to hand over the counter a basketful of the 
commodities represented in an index number. But, 
as we have seen, notes may circulate on a par with 
gold although they are not convertible into it, because 
the issuers may sufficiently limit them by watching 
the price of bullion and issuing more notes when that 
falls and fewer when it rises. So notes might be 
made to circulate on a par with a collection of commo-
dities such as is represented in an index number of 
prices although they are not convertible into that 
collection, because the issuers might sufficiently 
limit them by watching the prices of these commo-
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dities and issuing more notes when they fell and 
fewer when they rose. This is, however, the very last 
thing that m practice issuers, in the present state of 
economic instruction, are likely to do. They usually 
begin by adopting the exactly opposite principle 
because, incredible as it will appear to future ages 
they think " when prices are high, more currency 
is required. Turn this round, express it in another 
way, and you have " when the value of currency 
is low more of it is required " and currency is thus 
made a striking exception to the general rule that the 
falling value of an article indicates that additional 
supply of it is becoming less required. It is of course 
no exception at all. When money is reckoned in 
gold and more gold is produced, the value of money 
falls (general prices rise) and this indicates that 
additional supply of gold is less required: when 
money is reckoned in notes and more notes are 
produced, the value of money falls (general prices 
rise) and this indicates that additional supply of 
notes is less required. 
When more coal is produced, the value of coal 
falls, and this indicates that additional supply of coal 
is less required. Of course, if the coal-producers or 
the gold-producers accept a lower price for their 
product, they will find, down to a very low limit,plenty 
of " genuine demand " for it, but only because the 
demand has extended to take advantage of the lower 
price, and so it is with the note-producers : if they 
will accept smaller quantities of commodities and 
services in exchange for their notes, they will find 
down to a very low limit plenty of genuine demand 
for them, because they are cheaper. The only 
difference between coal and gold and notes is that 
coal is never money, while gold sometimes is, and 
notes always are : in consequence of which the value 
required in exchange for coal is always called its 
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" price," the value required for gold sometimes is and 
sometimes is not called its " price," and the value 
required for notes is never in ordinary language called 
their price. 
The feeble reply of the apologists to some such 
criticism as this is that in fact the rise of prices 
and wages comes first. This would be perfectly 
immaterial if it were true, which it probably is not. 
If it were true, it would only mean that the increase 
of the note-issue was anticipated. When a Govern-
ment has issued an additional £2,000,000 a week for 
months together, it is not unlikely that all business 
will be done on the assumption that this will continue. 
People may consciously or unconsciously expect a 
fall in the value of notes (a rise in general prices) 
just as well as they expect a rise in coal or jam. 
When issuers have once adopted the absurd maxim 
' 'Higher prices: issue more notes," their country 
finds itself in what puzzled critics call a " vicious 
circle "—notes are increased, prices rise, notes must 
be further increased to " carry the rise," prices rise 
still further, and notes must be still further increased 
and so on. Ad infinitum? No certainly: there is 
always an end to it. Often the real or fancied 
emergency which led to the suspension of convert-
ibility disappears before the process of bringing 
down the value of the notes has gone too far for 
recovery, and with the disappearance of the emer-
gency much of the bias in favour of that course is 
lost, and a return is made, perhaps slowly (as in 
America after the Civil War), perhaps painfully (as in 
England after the Napoleonic War), to a bullion 
standard. Two great inj ustices have been committed: 
the first to those persons and classes who suffered by 
the fall in the value of money, and the second to those 
v/ho suffered by its subsequent rise. The two do not 
cancel each other, since those who gain by the second 
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are not the identical persons who lost by the first, 
and vice versa. Institutions, too, suffer loss, though 
we can scarcely speak of justice in their case : one of 
the greatest losers is usually the State in its corporate 
capacity. The trifling gain made by issuing interest-
free notes instead of interest-bearing loans is far 
more than set off by the higher prices which the State 
has to pay for everything which it buys during a 
period when its expenditure would in any case have 
been abnormally large—higher prices which lead to 
the contraction of debt far exceeding in magnitude 
what would have been the whole cost of the commo-
dities and sen-ices obtained, if they had been paid 
for at the prices prevailing before and after the period 
of suspension. 
Unless a halt is called the end comes with a crash. 
In saying above that increases of the supply of coal 
or gold would always find plenty of demand at 
sufficiently reduced prices " down to a very low 
limit," we had in mind that no commodity is wanted 
in indefinite quantities. However the demand may 
extend, it will not extend indefinitely, and with every 
commodity there is a point beyond which no more 
will be required, however cheap the commodity can 
be got. It would take a considerable increase in 
the supply of coal to London to bring its price there 
down from say 30s. to 10s. a ton, but if a further 
increase of supply brought it down to 2s., it is quite 
certain that a very little increase on the top of that 
would bring it down to almost nothing. Nobody 
wants indefinite amounts. So, too, with gold, per-
haps even more clearly: very cheap gold would 
be unsuitable for currency and for ostentatious 
ornament, so two of the principal sources of demand 
for gold would cease to exist if gold were found in 
very large quantities. So it is with notes. As long 
as their increase is sufficiently slow and the total 
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amount not " unreasonably " large, no one thinks 
of questioning their utility as currency, and there 
is plenty of demand at the lower price at which they 
are put on the market. But if the increase goes on, 
sooner or later there comes a time when the increase 
is so rapid or the total outstanding becomes so large 
that even " the public " begins to wonder " what all 
this means," and when that happens distrust soon 
sets in, the general acceptability of the notes suddenly 
ceases, and they become absolutely worthless : some 
other currency is found to take their place. 
The conclusion to which this section has led us is 
that where the unit of account is a note, the value 
of money and the general level of prices depend on 
the will of the issuers, and that the issuers may, and 
probably will, if not restrained, bring the value of 
money down so low and drive prices up so high that 
confidence in the notes disappears and some other 
unit of account, such as coin or bullion, has to be used. 
The conclusion of the whole inquiry is that the 
value of money, which is the same thing as the 
general level of prices regarded inversely, is not an 
anomalous or even very peculiar thing, but depends 
in the same way as the value of other commodities 
upon the various influences which affect demand and 
supply : and that if peoples dislike the rise of prices 
which is another name for a fall in the value of money, 
they should insist on adequate limitation of the supply 
of money. 
This is a conclusion which has long been familiar 
to economists ; it is time it was grasped by the men 
who pride themselves on being practical. 
The above sections were written in August ana 
September, 1918, several months before the Armis-
tice and before any one supposed that the outpouring 
of currency would continue long after the war was 
finished. 
IO 
MONEY 
During the war it was difficult to discuss contem-
porary history in public with any considerable 
frankness. Now, in 1920, it is more worth while 
to examine the application to our own time of the 
general theory expounded in the foregoing pages. 
§ 6. Erroneous explanations of the rise of prices in 
1914-20. 
Innumerable causes, other than increase of cur-
rencies, have been suggested for the enormous rise 
of prices which has taken place since July, 1914, 
but three only seem worthy of detailed examination : 
(1) Scarcity of commodities, (2) rise of wages and 
(3) increase of bank deposits. 
(1) It is said very commonly that things are so 
dear because the supply has been so short since the 
war began. The first objection to be made to this 
doctrine is that it does not account for the dearness 
of things such as old books and pictures of which 
in fact the supply has been just as great as before 
the war. 
Waiving this we may point out that if the supply 
of literally everything had fallen off, the supply of 
the precious metals and of currency, whether made 
of the precious metals or paper, would have fallen off, 
and the scarcity of currency would be a counteract-
ing influence working against the scarcity of other 
commodities and services. We should not expect 
mankind to have higher prices merely because men 
had become, owing to disorganisation or any other 
cause, less able or willing to produce ordinary com-
modities and services, if at the same time their 
currency had been reduced in due proportion. A 
world poorer in all commodities including currency 
would not have higher prices. 
So it appears that when the explanation of scar-
city of commodities is put forward, what must be 
" D I M I N I S H E D P R O D U C T I O N " 
meant is not scarcity of all things including cur-
rency, but scarcity of all things other than currency 
—in other words a scarcity of " goods " in propor-
tion to currency, which is the same thing as plenti-
fulness of currency in proportion to " g o o d s . " So 
far as abstract theory goes, there can be found no 
difference of opinion between those who say that 
high prices are caused by less goods in proportion 
to currency and those who say that they are caused 
by more currency in proportion to goods. 
But there is a very considerable difference between 
those who say that the actual rise of prices during 
and after the war is due chiefly to diminution of 
goods and those who say it is due chiefly to increase 
of currency. This is not economic theory but 
economic history—the intelligent interpretation of 
economic facts. It may be roughly true that the 
rise of prices has been greatest where the disorgan-
isation and consequent reduction of output of goods 
is greatest : in Russia for example greater than in 
France, and m France greater than in the United 
States. But this is due to the fact that the govern-
ments of the countries where disorganisation is 
greatest are naturally those which are in greatest 
financial straits and consequently the most inclined 
to pay their way by increasing their paper currencies. 
It is impossible to name a single country where the 
increase of currency could be reasonably alleged 
not to be very much greater than the diminution 
1» goods. Europe is sometimes said to be starving 
but if the necessaries of life had diminished in any-
thing like the proportion in which the currencies 
have increased, more than half the population would 
have disappeared long ago. Of course there is con-
siderable difficulty in determining what exactly is 
meant by, say a fifty per cent, diminution of goods 
in general, as they cannot be supposed to diminish 
v 
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all in exactly the same proportion. So it may be 
suggested that a diminution of all goods proportion-
ate to the large increases of currency might have 
occurred in the form of a comparatively small reduc-
tion of necessaries and a very large reduction in 
luxuries. But this suggestion fails, firstly because 
luxuries are not a sufficiently large part of expendi-
ture to allow of the required diminution being made 
in that way, and secondly, because statistics and 
common observation show that there has been no 
very enormous diminution in luxuries. 
As for practical policy, it is to be remarked that 
even if there would have been some rise of prices in 
the absence of any increase of currencies, that would 
not have furnished a reason or excuse for increasing 
currencies, but rather the contrary. If, as is gener-
ally believed, stable prices are desirable, currency 
should be diminished, not increased, when things 
to buy are scarce. The old opinion that rising general 
prices stimulate production was probably always 
unconsciously based on an illogical deduction from 
the fact that a rise in the price of a particular kind 
of product encourages the production of that pro-
duct. Recent experience seems to refute the deduc-
tion, and to suggest that at any rate a rapid rise of 
general prices causes all kinds of disorganisation 
and hindrances to production. 
(2) Next we find that persons whose incomes 
consist chiefly of profits obtained by employing 
others at wages and selling the product, very com-
monly attribute the rise of prices to the rise of wages. 
When it is objected that the increased wages have 
generally been asked for and granted on the ground 
of the increased cost of living, which suggests that 
the rise in the price of things people live on precedes 
instead of following the rise of wages, these person« 
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answer that there is " a vicious circle." The rise 
of wages, they say, raises the cost of living, and the 
rise in the cost of living causes a new rise of wages, 
which in turn causes a new rise in the cost of living, 
and so on ad infinitum. But awkward questions 
present themselves. If there is no end to it, why was 
there ever a beginning ? And when was the begin-
ning ? W h y did the " vicious circle " only begin 
to wcrk when the paper currencies began to flow info 
circulation ? If it is alleged that the rise of wages 
necessitated the outflow of currency, we may inquire 
why the rise took place at that particular time, and 
if it is attributed to the outbreak of the war, we may 
ask why the reverse effect was not produced by the 
outbreak of peace. 
What is called " the vicious circle of rising prices 
and rising wages," if it existed, would bean example 
of " perpetual motion." The term " vicious circle " 
is commonly used of the particular kind of argument 
of which the doctrine that wages rise because prices 
rise and prices rise because wages rise is an excellent 
example. 
The rise of wages which has taken place, so far from 
being both cause and effect of the general rise of prices, 
is neither a cause nor an effect of it. It is simply 
part of the rise of prices. It is not a rise of wages 
in the sense of an increase of annual earnings due to 
greater output at the same piece-rates : it is a rise of 
piece-rates. A rise in the workers' piece-rates is a 
part of the rise of prices just as much as the rise of 
the rent of land or houses or the hire of any kind of 
machinery. The only difference is that the public 
seems to expect the owners of property to take 
their share of the increased price without giving any 
excuses, while, influenced by long-exploded economic 
doctrines, it expects the workers to excuse themselves 
by alleging that they cannot live on the old amount 
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of money now that it will buy less : an incidental 
consequence of which is that the higher class workers, 
who quite obviously can live on less than they used 
to do, have to wait longer before the necessity of 
raising their salaries is recognised. 
(3) If not a majority at any rate an influential 
and highly articulate minority of bankers and other 
persons concerned particularly with finance, believe 
that the rise of prices is due to government borrow-
ing from banks and a consequent increase in the total 
of bank deposits, which, they say, are purchasing 
power just as much as currency. The increase of 
deposits, they say, being much greater in absolute 
amount than the increase in currency, has had much 
more effect in raising prices. 
This explanation is admittedly particularist as 
regards both place and time. No one supposes that 
the depreciation of the Russian rouble, much greater 
than that of the English pound, is due principally 
to increase of deposits in the Russian banks. Nor 
does any historian known to me attribute the depre-
ciation of the assignats in France, of the greenbacks 
in the United States, or even of the Bank of England 
notes in the inconvertible period of 1797-1821, to 
the increase of bank deposits at the time. 
This particularism suggests that the objection is 
bad, but is not conclusive against it. Let us examine 
it carefully. 
It appears to be based on a fundamental miscon-
ception of what happens in deposit banking. What 
really happens is that A, B and C, having more 
money than they want to spend immediately, leave 
some of it for safety, convenience, and perhaps 
some small interest, with a person called a banker, 
and allow him to do what he likes with it on condition 
that he shall be always ready in business hours to 
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pay them or any one whom they nominate as much of 
it as they require. He, being intimately acquainted 
with their habits, knowing them perhaps better than 
they do themselves, can tell very nearly how much 
they wil l take out and put in next week, a little less 
approximately how much they will take out and put 
in the week after, and so on for a good many weeks. 
Consequently he is able with great safety in all 
ordinary times to lend out to X , Y and Z, w h o have 
not as much money as they can use profitably, a 
large portion of what A , B and C have lent him. It 
is only the fact that he cannot know exact ly when 
A , B and C will draw out, and cannot tie X , Y and 
Z to repay exact ly at the same time, which prevents 
him from trying to lend out the whole of what has 
been lent to him. A s things are, he finds it prudent 
to keep a considerable margin in hand. He m a y be 
fairly sure that A , B and C will have £100,000 to 
their credit a month from now, but to be on the safe 
side he had better assume that the amount may be, 
say, only £80,000, and so arrange to have only 
£80,000 lent at that period—or, in other words to 
have " a reserve " of £20,000. 
The first introduction of this system and its sub-
sequent extension evidently economise currency, 
and it is natural to suppose that anything which 
reduces the aggregate demand for currency must 
diminish the purchasing power of money. B u t some 
caution is necessary here. If the economy of currency 
effected is merely economy of convertible notes, no 
depreciation in the value of money will result. W e 
have seen (pp. 46-9) that the introduction of con-
vertible notes has some effect in depreciating the value 
of money, but if convertible notes have once come 
into circulation, and then people begin to prefer 
having a balance at a bank instead of a stock of con-
vertible notes in their own custody, the notes are 
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paid in and disappear from circulation, being re 
placed by " deposits," without affecting the aggre-
gate spending of the community in the least. A, B 
and C are just where they were, and the bankers 
cannot lend X , Y and Z a penny more than before. 
If the economy effected is economy of coin freely 
interchangeable with bullion, a certain amount of 
coined metal is released from monetary use, and con-
sequently the supply of bullion for non-monetary 
purposes in the world at large is increased, but owing 
to the elasticity of the world-wide demand for the 
metal for non-monetary purposes, its depreciation 
is not likely to be great (cf. above p. 47). 
If the economy effected is economy of inconvert-
ible notes, the case will be exactly the same as that 
of convertible notes provided that the issuers choose 
voluntarily to reduce the issue of inconvertible 
notes exactly as much as the issue of convertible notes 
would have been automatically reduced. It is only 
where (a) the economy which might be effected is 
economy of inconvertible notes, and (b) the issuers, 
instead of correspondingly reducing the issue, keep 
it just as large as it would otherwise have been, that 
we should expect the introduction of deposit banking 
into a particular country to cause a sharp depreciation 
of that country's money by appreciably increasing 
the currency to be spent there. 
Further, after the introduction of deposit banking 
has once reduced the private holdings of coin and 
notes to its minimum, the further increase of the 
aggregate of deposits no longer indicates any actual 
further economy of coin or notes. It may be that 
the increase shows that if deposit banking had not 
been in force, more currency would have been re 
quired, but it does not show that any actual currency 
has been dispensed with. This will be seen if the 
causes of further increase of deposits are considered. 
"INCREASE OF DEPOSITS" 
In the first place there is increase of population. 
Additional persons coming to years of discretion, 
instead of collecting large private holdings of coin 
and notes, keep small holdings, and start bank 
accounts : they release no already existing coin or 
notes. Secondly, there is the increase of wealth. 
Ceteris paribus, the richer people grow, the bigger 
their bank balances ; but no already existing coin 
or notes are released. Thirdly, there is an important 
cause of temporary fluctuation of the growth of 
deposits in the greater or less hesitation displayed 
by depositors in laying out money in business or 
investment. When they hurry to lay out money 
they reduce or reverse the normal growth of deposits ; 
when they hang back they accelerate the normal 
growth. When they hurry, they invest or lend 
more, and the banks have less to invest or lend: 
when they hang back, they invest or lend less, 
and the banks have more to invest or lend. 
The greater amount of deposits in this latter case 
does not mean that there has been any increase in 
aggregate spending and consequent depreciation of 
money. It simply means that more investment and 
lending has been done through the banks as inter-
mediaries and less directly by the real capitalists, 
the depositors. If people were content to leave 
much more money on deposit at banks, an immense 
extension of deposits would be possible without the 
smallest increase of spending. For example, the 
practice of private persons lending money on mort-
gage might be replaced by their putting the same 
amount on deposit with banks, and the banks lending 
it on mortgage. It would obviously be absurd to 
suggest that such a change would increase and depre-
ciate the currency. It would be childish to suggest 
that the banks had " created the money." 
None of these causes of change have been of great 
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importance during the past six years, and the great 
increase which has taken place in deposits is not to 
be explained by any of them. It is simply the result 
of the phenomenon of which it is supposed to be the 
cause—the depreciation of the purchasing power of 
money. Any one can see that if by Act of Parlia-
ment pennies were to be called pounds, the aggre-
gate number of pounds in the banks' deposits would 
be 240 times what it is (or thereabouts, seeing that 
the confusion caused by the change in contracts 
would cause some divergence). Any one can also see 
that so long as ¿1 was equivalent to 123J grains of 
standard gold, the amount of deposits depended on 
the value of gold. If gold had fallen to ^ of its 
former value, deposits would have risen to about 
240 times as many pounds sterling as formerly. If 
our incomes and property were valued at 240 times 
as many pounds as formerly, we should naturally 
keep 240 times as many pounds at our banks. Other-
wise we could not pay our way and do our business. 
Now since 1914 the unit of account has lost rather 
more than half its value ; what is there surprising 
in bank deposits having about doubled ? 
There is nothing odd or suspicious in the increased 
amount of money left with the banks by A, B and C 
having been largely lent to the Government. During 
the war the ordinary channels of investment were 
largely closed, and the Government borrowed what 
would otherwise have been lent by the banks to their 
usual debtors, X , Y and Z. 
§ 7. Actual explanation of the -rise of prices in 
1914-20. 
For some years before the war a gradual rise of 
prices was taking place. This was undoubtedly 
due to the relation between the demand for gold 
and the supply of it having been such that a depre-
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ciation of gold was inevitable. The demand, though 
good, was not increasing sufficiently to take off at 
the old value (measured in general pommodities and 
services) the large annual production which, when 
the South African war was over, succeeded the small 
production of the last part of the nineteenth century. 
If the late war had not occurred, that rise would have 
continued, and prices would now be substantially 
higher than in 1913, though of course not nearly so 
high as they actually are. 
The great rise which every one quite justly ascribes 
to the war is not such a complete and indivisible 
whole as the smaller rise which was going on before 
it. It is a rise which, though general, is of quite 
different magnitude in different countries. Within 
the area which used gold money before the war 
there is one set of countries, of which the United 
States is the principal, where the unit of account 
(e.g. the United States dollar) is still equal to a definite 
amount of gold, and that amount the same as before 
the war. These countries still move together in 
regard to prices, because they reckon them in the 
same standard. But the other countries have given 
up reckoning the prices of things in bits of gold of a 
certain weight and fineness, called sovereigns, twenty-
mark pieces, Napoleons and such-like. They reckon 
prices as before in pounds, marks and francs, but these 
are only paper notes which people are bound by law 
to accept in payment of a debt of a pound, a mark 
or a franc, and which will no longer do what they or 
similar documents did before the war, i.e. buy or 
procure for the holder certain definite amounts of 
gold which he can use as he pleases. Before the war, 
in this country any one who had a pound sterling due 
to him from a solvent person could demand and 
receive a gold sovereign which he could do what he 
liked with—sell it to somebody abroad, probably 
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to be melted down and coined into the currency of 
another country, or convert it into ornaments or 
dentists' material, or simply pay it away as he 
pleased. A t the present time, on the contrary 
there is no such interchangeability, or " convertibi-
lity " as it is called, between the actual medium of 
exchange and definite amounts of gold. True, if 
you have the requisite courage, you may go to the 
Bank of England and demand a sovereign in exchange 
for a £1 Currency Note, or five sovereigns in exchange 
for a £5 Bank of England note, but you will be care-
fully watched by detectives (at considerable expense 
to the State) and if you do anything which looks like 
preparing to melt down the coin or export it you will 
be fined or imprisoned. In other countries there is 
no such "British hypocrisy," and the paper is frankly 
inconvertible—the issuers, whether Government 
itself or a Government bank, make no pretence that 
the paper rouble, mark or franc is equal to gold coin. 
In fact all these paper units are worth much less than 
the gold to which they used to be equal is still worth. 
They are greatly " depreciated against gold." Some-
times people say that gold has appreciated, which is 
rather a natural thing to say when we hear that " the 
price of gold has risen." But it is misleading, since 
gold itself has depreciated against commodities 
and services in general. It is better to speak of 
gold as depreciated, and of these paper currencies 
as depreciated against this depreciated gold, and of 
course necessarily still more depreciated against 
commodities and services, which have accordingly 
risen in price still more in the paper standard countries 
than in the gold standard countries. 
The depreciation and consequent rise of prices is 
not uniform over all the paper countries, but varies 
greatly. 
Thus there are two great questions, first, why has 
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gold depreciated so that prices have risen even in 
the countries still reckoning in a gold standard, and 
secondly, why have the different paper standards 
depreciated still more and in varying degrees, so 
that the rise of prices, though everywhere greater 
than in the countries still using gold, is much greater 
in some of the paper countries than in others—in 
Russia than in France, for example, and in France 
than in England. 
1 . Gold has depreciated, because, while the stock 
was subject to no unusual wear and tear and the 
annual production went on almost undisturbed, 
the demand for it was immensely reduced by the 
war. Unlike most other important metals, it is not 
used in the manufacture of munitions of war, and 
little of it is used for other absolutely necessary pur-
poses, while on the other hand, being indestructible 
and containing much value in small bulk, it was a 
useful thing for necessitous countries to sell in order 
to buy with it things more urgently wanted. Accord-
ingly the belligerent states stopped buying any of 
the new gold produced in the world from month 
to month, and, going further, sent out a good deal of 
their old stock both of currency and ornamental 
gold into the neutral countries in order to buy 
munitions with. Thus the people of the neutral 
countries were offered the whole of the annual world's 
output of gold and also a considerable amount of the 
old stock of the belligerent countries, and naturally 
they got it cheap, that is, they did not give as much 
commodities and services for an ounce of it as they 
would have done before the war. In other words, 
prices rose when measured in gold. They have not 
fallen again because the annual output of gold goes 
on almost undiminished, and the belligerent countries 
have not yet, at any rate, been restored to their old 
position of large demanders. 
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For convenience of exposition I have in the pre-
ceding paragraph spoken only of the depreciation of 
gold in the neutral countries. But of course this 
depreciation is not confined to the countries which 
were neutral during the war, but is universal through-
out the world : the stoppage of demand in the belliger-
ent countries caused the value of gold to fall there 
as well as outside. In no country in the world'will 
an ounce of gold buy nearly as much commodities 
and services as it did before the war. We are apt 
to forget this when we read that the value of the gold 
in a sovereign is 26s. or something of that sort, until 
we remember that 26s. will not buy nearly as much as 
£1 did before the war. 
2. So much for the general rise of prices measured 
in gold. Now for paper prices. Any country which 
found it advisable to substitute a paper for a gold 
currency might conceivably have limited the paper 
currency to the amount which would have just 
sufficed to keep its value close to the value of the 
gold it represented when the substitution began to 
be effected. For example, when our £1 Currency 
Notes began to be issued, not only in England but all 
over the world a £5 Bank of England note had for 
a century been worth almost the same as five times 
123^ grains of standard gold, and the Currency Note 
began to circulate at the same value in gold, £1 
being worth 123J grains of standard (or about 113 
of the fine gold which the bullion market buys and 
sells). B y adequate limitation of the supply of both 
kinds of notes this relation between notes and gold 
would have been preserved. 
But the governments concerned thought it 
impossible thus to limit their issues. On the out-
break of the war they all very naturally began to buy 
goods and services regardless of expense. Some-
times in time of peace private individuals, overcome 
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by a general wave of optimism, by common consent 
take to buying much more than usual: then a " boom " 
sets in, prices rise, and producers, i.e. the com-
munity's producing side, think themselves very 
prosperous. Soon, however, they find that they are 
beginning to have to pay more for the commodities 
and services which they require in order to be able 
to sell finished products, so that their prospects are 
not nearly so rosy as they supposed, a " pinch for 
money " appears, and eventually, after some kind 
of financial crash, depression ensues. A government, 
however, which has started a war boom, has the power 
of postponing for a time the inevitable reaction, 
and feels that it must exercise this power or lose 
the war. Having ordered goods and services regard-
less of expense, it must pay for them somehow. 
With a currency of the existing magnitude it feels 
it cannot raise enough money either by taxation or 
by borrowing. The only resource it thinks, is to 
create more currency. 
The additional currency helps in two ways. 
First directly, because the government gets addi-
tional money to spend quickly and at no expense 
except the negligible expense of paper and print, 
so that it is able to get commodities and services 
from its people quicker than it could by taxing and 
without its people recognising that they are (as a 
body), just as much as when they pay taxes, giving 
up something which they would otherwise enjoy. 
Secondly, indirectly, because the spending of the new 
money is as clear an addition to the money-spending 
of the community as if a man fell out of the moon 
with the amount in his pocket and proceeded to 
spend it here ; it therefore prevents the " pinch for 
money " and removes the impossibility of the boom 
high prices being maintained. There is no crash, 
the money-yield of the taxes goes up because money-
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incomes and the prices of articles taxed ad valorem 
rise, and (which is more important) it becomes easier 
for the government to borrow money, since money-
incomes are raised, and though the cost of l iving 
is raised too, the surplus which the saving person has 
over his expenses will be greater, e.g. if a man is 
gett ing £1,000 a year and saving £200 of it and then 
his income (in money) and his expenses (in money) 
both double, he will be saving and able to lend the 
Government not £200 but £400. 
It will be said, especially in the light of the example 
just given, that this alleged second and indirect 
advantage to the Government is obviously unreal, 
inasmuch as government will lose as much or more 
b y having to pay higher prices as it gains b y being 
able to borrow easier. T h a t is true, but the excuse 
put forward on behalf of the governments is that if 
a n y one of them had allowed a financial crash to take 
place, its people would have realized the real burden 
of the war and refused to go on wi th it. I am not 
a politician, and will not attempt to decide how far 
this excuse is valid in any particular case. I will 
content myself wi th remarking that it is obvious that 
the excuse is not a very good one for the defeated 
countries, since it would have been better for them 
if they had refused to go on. 
Whatever the explanation of the issue of more 
currency, and whether it was justifiable or not, it 
took place, and continued not only during the war 
but down to the present time, the average weekly 
addition being indeed in some countries very much 
greater than it was in the height of the war. Hence 
the continued rise of prices at various rates in the 
different countries which occasions what is called 
" the dislocation of the exchanges." The exchanges 
have been dislodged from their old rate simply because 
the different paper units of account, pounds, francs. 
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marks, etc., have been issued in various degrees of 
excess, so that their relative purchasing power has 
altered. A pound exchanges for many more francs 
than it did before the war, because the issue of 
paper francs has been much more excessive than 
that of pounds : a pound exchanges for fewer American 
dollars than it did before the war because the issue 
of American paper dollars, though great, is limited 
to an amount which keeps them in their old relation 
to gold, while the issue of English paper pounds is 
not similarly limited. 
The future is doubtful. Some currencies, now 
depreciated, including the British pound, will pro-
bably be restored to their pre-war gold value by 
adequate limitation of supply. Others, much more 
depreciated, may be fixed in relation to gold at much 
below the pre-war level. In still other countries 
the existing paper, like the assignats and quite 
recently the various Mexican issues, will simply 
become waste paper and be replaced by a metallic 
currency. But whether gold itself will recover any 
or much the value which it has lost no man can tell, 
because it is at present impossible to estimate how 
far the currencies of the future will consist of gold and 
provide a continuous demand for the annual output, 
which is itself impossible to predict. 
A P P E N D I X ON T H E P E R I O D 1914-20 
1. The Movement of Gold.—In spite of much gold 
having been drawn in from active circulation as 
currency and some from use as ornament, the aggregate 
gold banking reserves of the United Kingdom, France, 
Italy, Germany and Austria-Hungary (or rather the 
Austro-Hungarian Bank), according to thé Swiss 
Bank Corporation's Financial and Commercial Review 
for 1919, fell from ¿381m. at June, 1914, to ¿370m. at 
December, 1919, while those of the European neutrals 
—Spain, Switzerland, Holland, Denmark, Sweden and 
Norway, rose from ¿55m. to ¿208m., and those of 
Japan, the United States, and Argentina, rose from 
¿438m. to ¿745m. These figures, though incomplete, 
are sufficient to show how gold has been deprived of a 
large and important part of its market, and conse-
quently been made more plentiful in the rest of the 
world, with the natural result of a great fall in its 
value or purchasing power everywhere. 
2. The Increase of Paper Currencies.—According to 
the same authority, the note circulations of Japan, 
the United States and Argentina, did not quite double 
during the same period, rising from ¿637m. to£i,2iom. 
Those of the European neutrals more than doubled, 
rising from ¿140m. to ¿375m. But those of the five 
European belligerents mentioned above increased 
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nearly thirteenfold, from /591m. to £7,457m. A most 
unsatisfactory feature of this increase was that no 
less than £2,176m. of it occurred in 1919 ; that is, in 
the calendar year which began seven weeks after the 
Armistice, these countries in the aggregate added to 
their paper currencies twice as fast as they added to 
them during the war. The British increase for 1919 
was £42111., a little less than half the average annual 
increase during the war, but the French increase was 
thirty per cent, more than the war average, the Italian 
about double, and the German and Austro-Hungarian 
each more than two and a half times as much. Nor is 
any general slackening observable in the first four 
months of 1920. 
3. The Depreciation of the Paper Currencies.—In 
these computations the £1 note is of course taken as 
¿1, and the foreign currencies at their old par values 
—25 francs., 20 marks, and so on, to the pound. 
Worked out per head of population, man, woman and 
child, the figure of ¿7,457m, gives what would, at the 
old level of prices, be grotesquely large amounts, 
namely, £10 for the United Kingdom, £20-7 for Italy, 
£35'9 for France, £37-5 for Germany, and some much 
higher figure for the Austro-Hungarian area. The 
most impoverished European belligerents rolling in 
money, while the neutral Dutch managed to do with 
£12-8, the Argentines with £12-3, and the Americans 
with £9-3 per head ! But the plethora of paper money 
had naturally reduced its purchasing power even 
compared with the greatly appreciated gold. A 
hundred pounds sterling were only worth the gold 
contents of 77-5 sovereigns; 100 francs were only 
worth the gold which used to be made into 47-5 francs 
in gold Napoleons ; 100 lire what used to be made 
into 39 lire ; and 100 marks what was made into 8*4 
marks in gold coin. Applying these percentages, we 
find the British man, woman and child, in possession 
a 
APPENDIX ON THE PERIOD 1914-20 82 
of only the equivalent of the gold in 7 7 5 sovereigns, 
the Italian in possession of the equivalent of 8-07 
sovereigns, the Frenchman, 17-05, and the German, 
3-15. The astonishing discrepancy between the last 
two of these figures could not possibly endure, and in 
fact has been somewhat reduced in the first four 
months of 1920. 
4. TheRelative rise of Prices in different Countries.— 
For figures illustrating the connexion between issues 
of currency and the prices of commodities, the reader 
should refer to the return moved for by Lord D'Aber-
non called Statements of Production, Price Movements 
and Currency Expansion in certain Countries (Cd. 434, 
price id.), and any continuations of it which may 
appear. 
ADDENDUM ON THE Y E A R 1 9 2 0 
The above pages from p. 64 onwards, written in 
April, 1920, may now in February, 1921, be supple-
mented by a few words on the year 1920. 
1. The Movement of Gold.—The Swiss Bank Cor-
poration's Review for 1920 shows little change in 
gold reserves except that those of Japan and Argen-
tina increased by ¿27|m. and £i6m. respectively. 
A n apparent increase of ¿36m. in the holding of Great 
Britain is unreal, being for the most part merely the 
result of the Bank of England, whose stock is pub-
lished, having taken over gold from the other banks, 
whose stocks are not published. 
The Eastern demand for gold for private hoarding 
and ornament was allowed to work more freely than 
in the preceding five years, but it is difficult to see 
much reason for suspecting any increase in the world's 
demand for these purposes. There was no special 
effort to increase bank reserves, and the demand for 
active circulation was nowhere resuscitated. 
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On the side of supply, or as the French more con-
veniently say, on the side of the " offer," we may 
discern some change. Gold is no exception to the 
rule that a fall in the value of a product discourages 
the output. People only imagine it to be an exception 
because they calculate the value of gold in depre-
ciated paper, thinking, for example, that gold is 
high when the price of it in English paper pounds 
has risen from £4-25 to £5-25, without reflecting that 
£5 5s. is worth much less in the commodities and 
services which they want to buy than £4 5s. was 
some years ago. There is no getting over the fact 
that when an ounce of gold will procure less of the 
goods and services necessary for working gold-mines, 
gold-mining becomes less profitable, and the least 
fertile mines cease to be worked. The world's out-
put of gold continued to fall in 1920, as it had been 
doing ever since 1915, the total decline between these 
years being about 25 per cent. 
On the top of this diminution of the supply proper 
there came at last in 1920 a check to the offer of 
gold by the belligerent area to the rest of the world. 
During the war, as we have seen, the belligerents 
parted with great quantities of gold in exchange for 
munitions, and in 1919, after it was over, Germany 
had to give up £s8Jm. of her stock in the Reichsbank. 
In 1920 there was no such unloading, so that on the 
whole, taking both demand and offer into considera-
tion, we need not be surprised that in the course of the 
year the long-continued fall in the value or purchasing 
power of gold was stopped. That the change was as 
violent as is shown in the price statistics of the United 
States and other countries, and caused so much 
dislocation as is shown in unemployment statistics, 
is due to deficiency of human foresight, as explained 
above, p. 21 ff. A whole literature concerning booms 
and depressions has been devoted to the manner in 
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which erroneous forecasts exaggerate such changes. 
2. The Increase and Decrease of Paper Currencies.— 
Increase was no longer universal, since the paper 
currency 'of the United States was reduced from 
¿983m. to ¿954m- (at Dec. 1) and that of Japan from 
¿159m. to ¿146m. The British paper apparently 
increased from ¿465m. to £510111., but £ i 5 | m . of this 
is due to a double reckoning caused by increase of 
Bank of England notes held against Currency Notes, 
while a sum about equivalent to the remaining 
£29jm. is believed to consist of Bank of England notes 
received by the other banks in exchange for their 
gold and held by them as tightly in reserve as the 
gold was. The French increase of about 630 million 
francs was small compared with the 7 milliard increase 
of 1919. The Italian increase was about 2J milliards 
as against 5 milliards in the year before. But the 
German increase rose from about 17 milliards of 
marks during 1919 to about 43 milliards during 1920. 
Countries not severely hit b y the war, which might 
easily have followed the United States in adhering 
to the gold standard, failed to do so. They took no 
steps to reduce their paper, and b y maintaining 
wholly unnecessary embargoes on the export of gold, 
they prevented a reduction being effected automati-
cally. Some of them even moved in the wrong 
direction ; the paper increased about 16 per cent in 
Argentine, 14 per cent in Denmark, and 12 per 
cent in Spain. 
3. The Depreciation of the Paper Currencies.—If 
currencies are taken at their old par values, the 
amount of money per head of population at the end 
of the year shows even more ludicrous discrepancies 
than at the end of 1919. To each person in the 
United States there appear about £9, to each in 
Italy about £22, to each in France about £36, 
and to each in Germany something like £70. But 
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when depreciation is allowed for, and each person is 
credited with only the gold sovereigns which his 
paper would buy in an outside and unrestricted 
market, the American reappears with 9 sovereigns, 
the Frenchman with 11, the Italian and the German 
4 each. Thus the suggestion made on p. 82 
that the French and German values would have to 
come closer has been borne out, though the dis-
crepancy is still far too wide to be enduring. The 
following table shows the extent to which currencies 
were depreciated against gold at the beginning and 
end of 1920 : — 
P E R C E N T A G E OF THEIR P A R G O L D V A L U E POSSESSED 
B Y C U R R E N C I E S 
Loss or 
Country. Jan. 2, Dec. 31, gain 
1920. 1920. per cent, 
on Jan. 2. 
Argentina I02'O 78-1 — 2 4 
Japan 101-2 95'2 - 6 
U.S .A 100-o 100-o Nil. 
Spain 99'5 69-2 — 3° 
Holland 9 3 ' 1 78-2 - 17 
— x 5 Switzerland . . . . 92-9 79-2 
Brazi l 3 y i 44-6 — 49 
Sweden 80-3 74-6 -- 7 
U . K 77'7 7 2 7 - 6 
Greece 76-5 38-2 — 50 
N o r w a y 75-8 57'3 — 24 
Denmark 7 K Ï 57-2 — 20 
France 48-1 3o-5 - 37 
I ta ly 39'2 18-0 — 54 
Portugal 28-5 9-6 - 66 
Finland 15-4 15-8 + 3 
Germany 8-5 5-8 — 32 
Poland 5-o 0 7 - 86 
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4. The Relative variation of Prices in Different 
Countries. — A continuation (Cd. 734, price 2d.) 
dated May 29, 1920, of Lord D'Abernon's return has 
been published, but is disappointing in not extending 
to the countries which have the more heavily depre-
ciated currencies, and of course it does not cover the 
year 1920. It must be remembered that the index 
numbers of prices are still much less trustworthy 
than in normal t imes: taxation and government 
subsidies have confused them, unusual scarcities of 
particular articles have often exercised too much 
influence in raising the index number because there 
was no provision for diminishing the " weight " of 
the article as substitutes took its place. It should also 
be remembered that though when a paper currency is 
healthy, little of it is held in countries other than 
that in which it is issued, a great deal is often held 
abroad in times when its relative value is expected 
b y foreigners to rise. Then the foreign speculator 
comes to the assistance of the issuing country, in effect 
making it a loan without interest, by purchasing and 
storing away its currency. This prevents an increased 
issue from immediately raising home prices and 
depressing foreign exchange as much as it would 
otherwise do. Later, when the foreigner, dis-
illusioned, sells his unfortunate investment for what 
it will fetch, the additional paper comes for the first 
time upon the home market and raises prices there 
just as if it were then newly issued. The D Abernon 
return is supplemented in some respects by Paper 
No. I l l (revised edition), Currency Statistics of the 
Brussels International Financial Conference, 1920. 
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